Alternativelessness: On the Beginning Problem of Hegel's Logic

Xiong, Zhili

doi:10.5840/idstudies2022322138

Cited by 2 publications

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“…13 See Wolff, 1996: 86-87, Hentrup, 2019, Dunphy, 2021. See also Hartnack, 1998: 8-10, andXiong, 2022. 14 See Maker, 1994: 79-82. But see Dunphy, 2020, for arguments to the effect that such a version of Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning, even if he in fact endorsed it, fails.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…10 10 For recent takes on Hegel's criticism, in the Logic , of Fichte's case for beginning from the “I”, see Xiong, 2022: 101‐102, Dunphy, 2023: 96‐101, and McNulty, 2023: 123‐124. McNulty makes a strong case for the importance of the “primitive” nature of the concept of being in this context. …”

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confidence: 99%

“…13 13 See Wolff, 1996, 2013: 86‐87, Hentrup, 2019, Dunphy, 2021, 2023: 110‐147. See also Hartnack, 1998: 8‐10, and Xiong, 2022. …”

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The Beginning of Hegel'sLogic

Dunphy

2023

Philosophy Compass

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This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's discussion of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

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The Beginning of Hegel'sLogic

Dunphy

2023

Philosophy Compass

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“…13 Emphasis added. 14 The scholarship has recently exhibited heightened interest in this moment of the Logic in terms of the 'problem of beginning' (see Dunphy 2020a, 2020b, and Xiong 2022. While I am not dealing precisely with this issue here, what I say in section IV regarding the beginning of logic for the Logic and how this beginning avoids the swimming problem may have implications for this debate over the standing of the Logic's beginning.…”

Section: Robert Engelmanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modern Scepticism, Metaphysics, and Absolute Knowing in Hegel's Science of Logic

Engelman

2022

Hegel Bulletin

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While there are good reasons to think that Hegel would not engage with modern scepticism in the Science of Logic, this article argues that he nevertheless does so in a way that informs the text's conception of logic as the latter pertains to metaphysics. Hegel engages with modern scepticism's general concerns that philosophy should begin without unexamined presuppositions and should come to attain not only knowledge of truth, but corresponding second-order knowledge: knowledge of knowing truth. These concerns inform two needs that Hegel formulates for first philosophy, which logic—by unifying with metaphysics, which is traditionally synonymous with first philosophy—is to satisfy. However, logic, for the Logic, is unified with metaphysics as a science of absolute knowing, the form of thinking involved in traditional metaphysics. As such, logic, for the Logic, is neither anti-metaphysical nor reducible to metaphysics, but is rather a science of metaphysical thinking, which, for Hegel, includes metaphysics. The article emphasizes how Hegel's construal of logic as a science of absolute knowing avoids running into the ‘swimming problem’ that Hegel raises against, broadly, epistemological forms of first philosophy.

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Alternativelessness: On the Beginning Problem of Hegel's Logic

Cited by 2 publications

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The Beginning of Hegel'sLogic

The Beginning of Hegel'sLogic

Modern Scepticism, Metaphysics, and Absolute Knowing in Hegel's Science of Logic

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