Alternative Multilateral Development Banks and Global Financial Governance

Reisen, Helmut

doi:10.17323/1996-7845-2015-02-106

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…To be sure, the creation of the AIIB was motivated also by the desire to close the funding gap in regard to infrastructure development in Asia (estimated to be about $8 trillion between 2010 and 2020) that existing institutions proved unable to close (Reisen 2015). However, if China's primary objective would have been to boost funding in infrastructure development in Asia, a much less costly and risky solution would have been to increase its capital subscription to the Asian Development Bank, which already spent more than half of its budget on infrastructure (Wilson 2019: 165).…”

Section: In the Global Governance Of Development Finance: The Wb Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Faude

Pařízek

2020

Rev Int Organ

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This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of “contested multilateralism” (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

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Section: In the Global Governance Of Development Finance: The Wb Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Faude

Pařízek

2020

Rev Int Organ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Alternative Multilateral Development Banks and Global Financial Governance

Abstract: What impact will the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),

Cited by 1 publication

References 7 publications

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

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