Abstract-In this article, the design of secure lattice coset codes for general wireless channels with fading and Gaussian noise is studied. Recalling the eavesdropper's probability and information bounds, a variant of the latter is given from which it is explicitly seen that both quantities are upper bounded by (increasing functions of) the expected flatness factor of the faded lattice related to the eavesdropper.By making use of a recently developed approximation of the theta series of a lattice, it is further shown how the average flatness factor can be approximated numerically. In particular, based on the numerical computations, the average flatness factor not only bounds but also orders correctly the performance of different lattices.
I. INTRODUCTIONIn the wireless wiretap scheme two legitimate communication parties, Alice and Bob, exchange information in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. In this setting, the communication parties rely on physical layer security rather than cryptographic protocols. Hence, Eve is assumed to have no computational limitations and know the cryptographic key, if any, but to have a worse signal quality than Bob.The objective of code design in a wiretap channel is to maximize the data rate and Bob's correct decoding probability while minimizing Eve's information. It was shown in the seminal paper of Wyner [1] that the legitimate parties can design codes with asymptotically non-zero rate, zero error probability and zero information leakage. Today, this setup is particularly interesting in wireless channels that are open in nature but vulnerable to distortions As a practical construction of a wiretap code, [2] introduced the general technique of coset coding, where random bits are added to the message to confuse the eavesdropper. In the specific case of a wireless channel, where lattice codes are suitable, the code lattice Λ b is endowed with a sublattice Λ e ⊂ Λ b which carries the random bits [3].