Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001

Cited by 28 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…To pin down which equilibrium partition to look at, (1) and (2) imply that the equilibria of this model can be Pareto ranked, and there always exists an equilibrium which maximizes the payoffs of both players for any given q. In what follows, we focus on this equilibrium, which we call the most efficient MPE-q, for it is Pareto superior to all other MPE-q.…”

Section: Can More Information Facilitate Communication?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An emerging consensus in the literature is that the receiver can extract less information via cheap-talk communication as she becomes more informed, i.e., information acquisition and communication are substitutes. 2 The underlying force is fairly simple once we carefully dissect why any information can be conveyed in a cheaptalk environment. When the receiver is endowed with her own private information, the receiver naturally becomes less sensitive to whatever the sender insists.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The only difference from the original setup of CS is that we allow for the possibility that the receiver observes a possibly informative signal of the state of nature. The signal is either perfectly informative (with probability q) or noisy (with the remaining probability), but the receiver cannot tell whether any given signal is informative or not -the type of noise structure which may be referred to as "replacement noise" (Ambrus and Lu [2]). 11 What is critical in this specification is the way noise is introduced into the receiver's signal: in the current setting, the receiver faces uncertainty not only about the state of nature but also about the accuracy of the signal.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

Ishida

Shimizu

2018

Econ Theory

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In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus on the "dual role" of the sender's message in our context: when the receiver's prior belief is subject to higher-order uncertainty, the sender's message provides information not only about the true state but also about the reliability of the receiver's private information. Building on this result, we argue that whether information acquisition and communication are complements or substitutes depends crucially on the extent of uncertainty regarding the information source.

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Section: Can More Information Facilitate Communication?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

Ishida

Shimizu

2018

Econ Theory

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“…Finally, Ambrus and Lu () and Rubanov () construct equilibria in a unidimensional policy space that are arbitrarily close to full revelation. Both papers show that their equilibria survive the introduction of a small probability of the senders observing a random state that is independent of the true state.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

Meyer

Barreda

Nafziger

2019

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This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i.e., one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition-the local deterrence condition-that relates the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver-the min rule-that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists.

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“…Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) investigate the effects of being able to solicit a second opinion from a different expert, in a dynamic model in which experts are not biased but it is costly for them to gather information. Another line of literature investigates multi-sender extensions of the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and finds that under certain conditions there can be equilibria in which the receiver can extract full or almost full information from the senders (Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Austen-Smith (1993), Wolinsky (2002), Battaglini (2002Battaglini ( , 2004, Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), Ambrus and Lu (2014)). As opposed to the above papers, we investigate settings in which the principal cannot solicit information from experts and then take the action choice herself.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

Ambrus

Baranovskyi²,

Kolb

2015

SSRN Journal

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We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being able to ordinally compare the two proposals, has to choose one of them. The selected expert might receive a bonus payment. We show that having a second expert benefits the principal, even if the two experts have the same biases and the bonus of the winner is zero. In contrast with other models of expertise, in our setting the principal prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases. Increasing the bonus brings experts closer to truthful reporting, but this only benefits the principal up to a threshold level, with further increases in the bonus strictly decreasing her payoffs. A methodological contribution of our paper is characterizing restrictions on the set of strategies which allows a formal generalization of ex ante expected payoffs to games with diffuse prior.

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Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Cited by 28 publications

References 29 publications

Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

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