Alliance Norms and War: A New Piece in an Old Puzzle

Kegley, Charles W.; Raymond, Gregory A.

doi:10.2307/3013963

Cited by 32 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…The writings of Thomas Aquinas on Just War are used here as a basis for further discussion on morality, and each student is assigned ''On War'' to read. 7 In relation to the concept of anarchy, some place an emphasis on rules and norms (Kegley and Raymond 1982) as being important factors in preventing conflict. In this movie, we can see that order and hierarchy can be created, but when order breaks down, conflict is likely to arise.…”

Section: Lord Of the Flies (1963 92 Minutes)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Teaching Introduction to International Politics with Film

Valeriano

2013

Journal of Political Science Education

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Section: Lord Of the Flies (1963 92 Minutes)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Teaching Introduction to International Politics with Film

Valeriano

2013

Journal of Political Science Education

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“…Alliances are institutions that reduce uncertainty and manage distributional issues (Keohane and Martin 1995). Strategically interdependent states are unlikely to engage in conflict due to their increased security and ability to deter aggression (Kegley and Raymond 1982). Finally, as strategic interdependence in the international system increases, the incentives for conflict decline 7…”

Section: Dependence Interdependence and International Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis

Maoz

2008

American J Political Sci

129

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This study develops a Social Network Analytic approach to conceptualize and measure interdependence across levels of analysis. This framework contains several innovations. First, it integrates "sensitivity interdependence"-the effects of changes in one state on other states-with "vulnerability interdependence"-the opportunity costs of breaking a relationship. Second, it measures interdependence at different levels of analysis and across multiple relationships. Third, it integrates multiple dimensions of interdependence into a single measure. I derive hypotheses from the realist and liberal paradigms regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on monadic, dyadic, and systemic conflict. These hypotheses are tested via data on alliances, military capability, and trade. The findings provide robust support to the expectations of the liberal paradigm regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on conflict. On the other hand, the expectations of the realist paradigm are not supported. I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of this approach.

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“…Other signs of a defender-protege relationship, such as a formal defensive alliance, are also thought to affect a potential aggressor's decision to Downloaded by [University of Lethbridge] at 05:08 24 June 2016 attack (or escalate against) a small allied country (Levy, 1981;Kegley and Raymond, 1982;Smith, 1995). However, this remains somewhat of an open question.…”

Section: Value Of the Issue At Stakementioning

confidence: 95%

Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence

Carlson¹

1998

International Interactions

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The effort to explain escalation processes using formal and empirical models has yielded numerous insights. However, there have been relatively few attempts to integrate these two approaches such that the results from an empirical test of escalation behavior are interpreted within and based on a well specified theory of escalation. This paper bridges that gap by developing a formal theory of escalation processes to derive hypotheses that identify the conditions under which states escalate in conflict. A player's decision to escalate or back down is based on an estimate of the opponent's cost tolerance-the maximum costs a player will withstand to achieve a demand in the game. The hypotheses derived from the theory are general and applicable in many contexts that involve escalation processes. In this paper, the hypotheses are tested empirically in the context of extended deterrence crises. The test confirms the theory's expectations and reveals strong support for the hypotheses. The theory offered here, I argue, provides a better explanation for the patterns found in the data than do the theories used in previous studies of extended deterrence.

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Alliance Norms and War: A New Piece in an Old Puzzle

Cited by 32 publications

References 17 publications

Teaching Introduction to International Politics with Film

Teaching Introduction to International Politics with Film

The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis

Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence

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