All Roads Lead to Outside Ownership: Polish Piecemeal Privatization

Mickiewicz, T; Bałtowski, Maciej

doi:10.4337/9781781950951.00031

Cited by 8 publications

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“…The change in the Presidency that did occur, when Kwaśniewski took over from Wałęsa on 23 December 1995, is studied empirically in the third specification in Table 3. Moreover, the same minister was in charge of the privatization programme throughout the period 1993–1996, arguably the main period for the privatization timetable (Mickiewicz and Baltowski, 2003). It is also likely that, to some extent, the details of privatization programme were determined by the officials of the relevant ministry rather than top politicians, and so less affected by short‐term political pressure.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹

Fraja¹,

Roberts²

2009

Economics of Transition

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This article uses the sequencing of privatization to infer the objective pursued by the Polish government in the privatization of its large manufacturing firms in the second half of the 1990s. We construct a model of mixed oligopoly and use it to evaluate the privatization process; our analysis is based on the assumption that firms which furthered the government's objective function the most would be chosen to be privatized first. Based on the features of the firms that were chosen for early privatization, our empirical analysis suggests that welfare maximization was more important than the desire to maximize the revenues from privatization and the government's budget or to minimize employment losses.JEL classifications: D63, L33, P35.1 Authors thank a referee of this journal for many helpful comments on an earlier draft. 532De Fraja and Roberts

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹

Fraja¹,

Roberts²

2009

Economics of Transition

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“…Foreign investors were usually involved in a complex negotiation process with multiple stakeholders, including local governments, management and workers' councils, with each party following a different agenda. Although foreign investors normally aimed for full control of acquired businesses to reduce transaction costs, and to facilitate their rapid restructuring, in many cases the government retained a minority shareholding or imposed legal limits on foreign ownership in sectors such as telecommunications, banking and utilities, particularly in Poland and Slovakia (Mickiewicz & Baltowski, 2003). At the same time, gradual economic liberalization increased opportunities for greenfield ventures and full or partial acquisitions from private owners (Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004).…”

Section: Conceptual Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of CEE, although small and medium-sized companies were privatized using a wide range of different methods, the pattern of privatization of large firms was similar. The majority of countries opted for privatization through divestment of state assets to strategic investors, with a crucial role being played by MNEs (see Major (2003) and Mickiewicz and Baltowski (2003) for a review). Acquisitions in transition economies were a particularly attractive form of entry when investors required complementary assets held by local firms, and when legal and institutional barriers prevented the establishment of greenfield operations or made them costly (Meyer & Estrin, 2001).…”

Section: Conceptual Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership structure, strategic controls and export intensity of foreign-invested firms in transition economies

2008

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This paper examines the relationships between foreign ownership, managers' independence in decision-making and exporting of foreign-invested firms in five European Union accession countries. Using a unique, hand-collected data set of 434 foreign-invested firms in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia, we show that foreign investors' ownership and control over strategic decisions are positively associated with export intensity, measured as the proportion of exports to total sales. The study also analyzes specific governance and control configurations in foreign-invested firms, showing that foreign equity and foreign control over business functions are complementary in terms of their effects on export intensity. Journal of International Business Studies (2008) 39, 1133–1148. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400404

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“…The former case relates in particular to companies privatised through employee buy-outs (see Mickiewicz and Baltowski, 2003). We are also aware of the fact that some sources do not distinguish between individual companies and consolidated balances of capital groups with similar names.…”

Section: Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

2005

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Using panel data on large Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. We find that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth and that, in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Interestingly, we find that being privatised has a positive impact on employment growth but that this impact is concentrated within a range of three to six years after privatisation. In contrast with the findings of earlier literature, we find evidence that there are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. On the other hand, employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these combined results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is constrained by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints. Consistent with this, we find that privatised companies, three to six years post-privatisation, are the firms for whom employment is most responsive to positive sales growth and as such, offer the best hope for rapid labour market expansion.

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All Roads Lead to Outside Ownership: Polish Piecemeal Privatization

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹

Ownership structure, strategic controls and export intensity of foreign-invested firms in transition economies

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

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All Roads Lead to Outside Ownership: Polish Piecemeal Privatization

Cited by 8 publications

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Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?1

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?1

Ownership structure, strategic controls and export intensity of foreign-invested firms in transition economies

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

Contact Info

Product

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About

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹

Privatization in Poland What was the government trying to achieve?¹