All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism

Garcia, Ernesto V.

doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-042

Cited by 4 publications

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“…7 7 See Franks, 2005: 377‐379, or Dunphy, 2023: 104‐107, for further discussion of Hegel's attitude towards beginning from a fundamental principle. …”

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The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Dunphy

2023

Philosophy Compass

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This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's discussion of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic.

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“…7 7 See Franks, 2005: 377‐379, or Dunphy, 2023: 104‐107, for further discussion of Hegel's attitude towards beginning from a fundamental principle. …”

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confidence: 99%

The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Dunphy

2023

Philosophy Compass

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“…Darwall 2013and 2014, Neuhouser 1994, and Nance 2012 3Clarke 2016, Kosch 2017, Ware 2009and Franks 2005 …”

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Between Thinking and Acting Fichte’s Deduction of the Concept of Right

Ramsauer

2023

Manuscrito

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Fichte's ambitious project in the Foundations of Natural Right is to provide an a priori deduction of the concept of right independently from morality. So far, interpretations of Fichte's deduction of the concept of right have persistently fallen into one of two rough categories: either they (re)interpret the normative necessity of right in terms of moral or quasi-moral normativity or they interpret right's normative necessity in terms of hypothetical imperatives. However, each of these interpretations faces significant exegetical difficulties. By contrast, I argue that we can  I am grateful to the participants of the University of Chicago's German Philosophy Workshop for their helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks are owed to Matthias Haase, whose insightful feedback has helped me immensely thinking through this topic.

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“…Tra coloro che avversano questa ipotesi vi sono, invece, Beck (1960), Korsgaard (1989, pp. 159-187), Allison (1990), Rawls (2000), Franks (2005), Guyer (2007, pp. 444-464), Timmermann (2010, pp.…”

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Il fatto della ragione e la conoscenza adeguata: Kant con Spinoza

Campo¹

2022

Tópicos (México)

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Recentemente la letteratura dedicata alla ricezione kantiana di Spinoza ha conosciuto un sensibile incremento. Diversi sono gli studi consacrati alla mappatura della presenza di quest’ultimo negli scritti sia precritici che critici del primo, e diversi sono i risultati conseguiti da ciascuno. Eppure, con l’eccezione di qualche richiamo alla sezione in cui lo spinozismo è presentato come l’unica alternativa all’idealismo trascendentale, la Critica della ragion pratica non è quasi mai menzionata né, tanto meno, si è soliti guardare ad essa nel tentativo di trovare qualcosa che attenui il contrasto tra le due prospettive. Scopo del presente saggio è mostrare come sia proprio nella seconda Critica, e in particolare introducendo il Faktum della ragione, che Kant pensa, per così dire, assieme a Spinoza. Nel 1788, la legge morale si comporta come un’idea adeguata che ci rende cause attive, e l’esperienza della libertà procurata dalla coscienza che ne abbiamo risulta essere, perciò, analoga all’esperienza dell’eternità illustrata dal V libro dell’Etica.

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All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

The Beginning of Hegel's Logic

Between Thinking and Acting Fichte’s Deduction of the Concept of Right

Il fatto della ragione e la conoscenza adeguata: Kant con Spinoza

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