Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Country, Sri Lanka

“…It indicates that there is no evidence to prove CHs are influenced by board independence and board meetings. The findings of this study lend some support to the findings of Nadiri (1969), Dittmar et al (2003), Saddour (2006), Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), Kuan et al (2011), Lau andBlock (2012) and Shah (2012, Chen andChuang (2009). Further, there is a significant impact of FS as control variable on CH, it reveals that FS is the most important firm specific factor in determining the amount of CH of the listed companies in Sri Lanka and also there is a little increase in the impact of CGPs with industry effect and year effect.…”

“…However, Chen and Chuang (2009) found a positive relation between outside director and cash holdings since the nature of high-tech firms requires them to hold more cash for future investment.…”

Managerial Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings: Insights from an Emerging Market

“…They show this result as supportive of the role of managerial discretion agency costs in determining cash holding levels. Chen and Chuang (2009) find that CEO ownership, venture capitalist directors and independent directors positively affect cash holdings in high-tech firms which is consistent with the interest alignment hypothesis. Harford (1999) and Opler et al (1999) are among the studies which do not find any relation between cash holdings and firm-level corporate governance.…”

Board Characteristics, Political Connections, and Corporate Cash Holdings: The Role of Firm Size and Political Regime

“…Moreover, as compared to physical assets, massive cash holding can more easily be used by managers for private benefits (Chen & Chuang, 2009). Belghitar and Khan (2013) found that any change in excess cash holding depends on a firm's corporate governance structure.…”