Algunas reflexiones sobre el federalismo fiscal en la Argentina. Apuntes para el diseño de un nuevo sistema de coparticipación federal de impuestos

Vega, Daniel; Cetrángolo, Oscar; Jiménez, Juan Pablo

doi:10.2307/3467445

Cited by 6 publications

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“…7 6 Abuelafia et al (2006: 207) illustrate the mechanics underpinning this pattern of provincial spending by pointing out that in 2003 the federal government raised 81 percent of all tax resources but spent only 53 percent -because it channeled 5.85 percent of GDP to the provinces via revenue sharing and other transfers. 7 Cetrángolo and Jiménez (2003) cite various causes for the marked increase in provincial spending: the transfer of education and health services from the national level in the early 1990s; the rise in provincial indebtedness between 1996 and 1999; the steady growth in personnel expenditures since 1983; and the "flypaper effect" since 2002. The trends towards consolidation, hierarchization, and centralization of resources at the federal level are clear enough, but the path to their realization does not appear as steady or straightforward.…”

Section: Vertical Fiscal Balancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reforms are resisted by governors and legislators, who are interested in tailoring them either to spare their constituents from their consequences or to postpone the effects of reform on their constituents as much as possible. These strategic aims of governors and legislators stem from the fact that their power depends upon a) local electoral control and b) access to intergovernmental transfers, which finance between 50 percent (Buenos Aires) and over 80 percent (La Rioja, Formosa) of their expenditures (Cetrángolo and Jiménez, 2003). Provincial actors thus typically seek to impose institutions and/or policies that a) decentralize spending and the management of resources in general (such as social programs, funds for public infrastructure, etc.)…”

Section: The Fiscal Decision-making Process In Argentina: Dynamics Of...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The extent of this dependence is, predictably, highly heterogeneous: while the province of Buenos Aires finances around 50 percent of its budget with its own resources, over 74 percent of the income of Formosa is provided by intergovernmental transfers(Cetrángolo and Jiménez, 2003).…”

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The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

Bonvecchi

2010

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This paper investigates the political economy of fiscal reform activism in Argentina since the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions sixteen times. Tax and budgetary reforms moved from centralizing revenue sources and spending authority in the federal government to mild decentralization lately. Fiscal federal rules combined centralization of revenues and management in the federal government with short-term compensations for the provinces. This paper contends that reform activism can be explained by the recurrence of economic and policy shocks while reform patterns may be accounted for as consequences of the decreasing political integration of national parties in a polity whose decisionmaking rules encourage the formation of oversized coalitions. The decrease in political integration weakened the national party leaderships ability to coordinate intergovernmental bargaining, and strengthened the local bosses and factions needed to form oversized coalitions.

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Section: Vertical Fiscal Balancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Fiscal Decision-making Process In Argentina: Dynamics Of...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

Bonvecchi

2010

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Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America

Díaz-Cayeros

2006

186

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This book explores the politics of fiscal authority, focusing on the centralization of taxation in Latin America during the twentieth century. The book studies this issue in great detail for the case of Mexico. The political (and fiscal) fragmentation associated with civil war at the beginning of the century was eventually transformed into a highly centralized regime. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization can best be studied as the consequence of a bargain struck between self-interested regional and national politicians. Fiscal centralization was more extreme in Mexico than in most other places in the world, but the challenges and problems tackled by Mexican politicians were not unique. The book thus analyzes fiscal centralization and the origins of intergovernmental financial transfers in the other Latin American federal regimes, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. The analysis sheds light on the factors that explain the consolidation of tax authority in developing countries.

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The Politics of Fiscal Legitimacy in Developmental States: Emergency Taxes in Argentina Under Kirchnerism

Barlow

Peña

2021

New Political Economy

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In times of crisis, governments can resort to tax rises and emergency taxation schemes to finance extraordinary needs. These schemes often generate tensions in the fiscal contract between the state and society, as they affect basic definitions regarding who is taxed, for how much, and what for. In the context of developing economies, where available sources of extraordinary rents are limited, dealing with these tensions can be problematic as it involves reconciling questions of fiscal legitimacy with the interests of influential economic sectors. This article analyses these tensions by exploring the case of Argentina in the aftermath of the 2001 debt default crisis, when emergency taxes on agricultural exports were implemented and then expanded under Kirchnerist administrations pursuing a 'post-neoliberal' developmental agenda. However, we argue that the government failed in legitimating this fiscal agreement, resulting in a tax rebellion by the rural sector in 2008 followed by the growing polarisation of the policy in partisan terms. By bringing to the fore the challenges and conflicts involved in legitimating tax collection, the article illuminates an overlooked aspect of the political economy of developmental states, particularly those seeking to enhance state autonomy while pursuing redistributive goals.

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Algunas reflexiones sobre el federalismo fiscal en la Argentina. Apuntes para el diseño de un nuevo sistema de coparticipación federal de impuestos

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America

The Politics of Fiscal Legitimacy in Developmental States: Emergency Taxes in Argentina Under Kirchnerism

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