2023
DOI: 10.3982/ecta19559
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment

Mohammad Akbarpour,
Scott Duke Kominers,
Kevin Michael Li
et al.

Abstract: We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee nothing when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm's allocative and investment guarantees coincide if and only if its confirming negative externalities are sufficiently small. We introduce fast approximation algorithms for the knapsack problem that hav… Show more

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