Algeria's presidential election of April 2004: a backward step in the democratisation process or a forward step towards stability?

Abstract

Algeria's third plural presidential election caught the imagination of the Algerian electorate like no one has done before. Previously, the results were known in advance and elections served only to confer legitimacy on decisions made elsewhere, invariably by the military. This 2004 election seems to be more open. At least in theory, for the first time in Algeria's history, the winner of this election is not going to be the explicit choice of the military. In addition to the neutrality of the army, the autonomy of the former ruling party, the FLN and the unprecedented criticism of the President, the ingredients for an open and exciting election were in place. While most candidates engaged in negative campaigning, sometimes even at the expense of their political manifestos, the incumbent president stressed his achievements, particularly on the security front. 'National reconciliation', the way towards the establishment of further peace, dominated his political campaign and turned the election to a referendum on stabilit

Reforming the Algerian electoral system

“…Finally, the declaration by the military hierarchy, prior to the April 2004 presidential election, that it would not have a candidate and would recognise and work with the next elected president even if he was an ' Islamist ', is the most significant development in the already painful Algerian process of democratisation. The election nonetheless saw the return of incumbent President Bouteflika in a seemingly open contest with 84.99% (Bouandel 2004), reminiscent of Algerian election results in the 1980s, and suggests that whilst elections are held on a regular basis for the different levels of government, the electoral process remains inherently authoritarian. N O T E S 1.…”

The Democratizer Army Paradox: The Role of the Algerian Army in Impeded Democratization

“…In this sense, the army’s role in independence is marked as the first IV of the pathogenesis dimension, PD1 . For PD1 there have been voluminous numbers of studies conducted (Abi-Mershed 1998; Arshad, 2017; Bouandel, 2004; Gafaiti, 1999; Tessler et al, 2004;) which can be briefly epitomized by the fact that the army became the most legitimate representative of Algerian society with a certain monopoly of coercion at its disposal. Having the authority at hand the army then swiftly channeled its interests to potential rents both for its sake and allocation in terms of more influence and legitimacy.…”

Legitimacy and the politics of opposition in the Middle East and North Africa

“…The government agreed to hold another set of local elections for the state assemblies and communes in Kabylia. Moreover, since 2004 the regime had tried to discredit the movement, with measured success, by branding it a regionalist movement backed by foreign forces (Bouandel 2004(Bouandel :1527. This campaign, essentially a government public relations effort, was successful in convincing much of the rest of country that the Kabylia movement was now some sort of threat.…”

“…Although this amnesty agreement did decrease levels of violence, it was far from eradicated. The media reported regularly on terrorist attacks and assassinations, and "many parts of the country remained unstable" (Bouandel 2004(Bouandel :1527. Since Bouteflika took office approximately 50,000 additional Algerians were "victims of civil strife" (Tlemçani 2008:6).…”

“…The passage of the concorde civile in 1999, by a huge margin, was actually the beginning of a period where Bouteflika had public support. with one group supporting Benflis, the other Bouteflika (Bouandel 2004(Bouandel :1531. In The military had opposed amnesty for fear the agreement could expose their activities during the "dirty war," including the use of torture and extrajudicial killings.…”