Al Qaeda in Mali: The Defection Connections

Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political ecological explanation

“…organisation relate to national dynamics. This literature has discussed the largely overlapping topics of international jihadism and its tributaries in the country (Huckabey 2013, de Castelli 2014, Harmon 2014, Lounnas 2014, Walther and Christopoulos 2015, drug trafficking and hijacking of hostages as sources of funding for armed groups (Daniel 2012, Detzi and Winkleman 2016, the dynamics, politics and history of the Tuareg rebellions (Cline 2013, Zounmenou 2013, Bøås and Torheim 2013, Bøås 2015, the current crisis in the national democratic system and the weakening of the state (Gonin et al 2013, Baudais 2015, Ba 2016), the international military intervention and possibilities for peace and stability (Cristiani and Fabiani 2013, Galy 2013, Hanne 2014, Ping 2014, Boeke and Tisseron 2015, Boeke and Schuurman 2015, Wing 2016, the complex and changing Islamic national landscape (Soares 2013), and the Malian crisis as a fallout from the Libya conflict (Shaw 2013, Solomon 2013. While most of these contributions highlight a combination of factors, and some also stress the complexity of understanding the Malian crisis (Lecocq et al 2013), we have grouped the various contributions above according to what we see as the main themes emerging from this literature.…”

Moving Through Conflict: Transit Migration and Rebel Capacity in Mali

“…As Walter (2017, 8) points out, extreme ideologies can offer “significant organizational advantages over more moderate groups, especially in environments with multiple competing rebel groups, weak rule of law, and bad governance.” In the competitive environment of Northern Mali, Jihadist ideologies are employed as an inclusive mechanism (Boukhars 2018), largely due to its adaptability in the context of sociocultural tensions (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019). Indeed, as the conflict in Mali became increasingly fragmented, both MUJAO and Ansar Dine preached that their combat was in the name of Islam, and not Arabs, Tuaregs, blacks, or whites, thus appealing to the broader West African population (Huckabey 2013). Yet, most West Africans have no apparent link to the groups’ jihadist ideology, and interviews with former members indicate that prior religious conviction was not a requirement for participation (Thiénot 2013).…”

The Fall of Muammar Gaddafi and the Contemporary Security Debacle in West Africa: An Examination of Interconnectedness

“…It should be noted that Bahanga was not the only Tuareg committed and hoping to initiate uprising in northern Mali. In November 2010, a meeting, largely attended by northern Tuareg was organized in Timbuktu and ends with the creation of National Movement of Azawad (NMA) which primarily rejected violence but called for display of solidarity from Azawadians inside Mali and beyond the country's borders (Heisbourg, (2013) (Huckabey, (2013). Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said that the toppling of the longtime Libyan dictator, the events in Mali and the US consulate attacks in Libya are all interlinked and added that the Libyan civil war produced many uncontrolled trained and armed militants who continue to fuel violence in the region, including the atrocities committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Onojeghen, 2019) In August 2012, Minister of State for Defence, Mrs. Olusola Obada confirmed speculations that Libyan weapons had found their way into Nigeria.…”