Air Power and Maneuver Warfare

Abstract

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Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining

“…Elimination of Gaddafi's air capacity provided an important advantage for the anti-Gaddafi forces. Despite the arguments that air warfare is not an efficient strategy by itself and should only be employed to assist ground operations (Pape 1996;Van Creveld et al 1994), the latest technological developments have narrowed the power gap between air and ground-based campaigns down. The Libyan intervention took advantage of increased reach via air-to-air refueling, used unique aircraft with especially fast top speeds, and benefited from long-range missiles with high levels of accuracy and advanced control systems.…”

The Better Blitzkrieg: A Comparison of Tactical Airpower Use by Guderian and Patton

“…12 He failed to mention that the Luftwaffe protected the "long, exposed flanks" of the Wehrmacht, the result of maneuver by the German mobile forces, by flying sorties into rear areas of the Polish army. 13 He also failed to mention that "the efforts of the Luftwaffe . .…”

“…Indeed, as the German army only required the Luftwaffe to fly interdiction well in front of and to the sides of its armored thrusts, the Luftwaffe only had to maintain familiarity with the general situation of the German army. 17 Guderian's libeling of the Luftwaffe's contribution to his success in 1940 continued as he described a perceived lack of air support. During the French campaign in 1940, the Luftwaffe operated as an interdiction force, exactly as Guderian described; yet he often expressed concern that he was not receiving the air support he required.…”

Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm

“…45 According to Korean War veteran Colonel John Boyd, who first articulated the concept in terms of its role in warfighting, the person who goes through this series of steps (or loop) quicker than his opponent does will be inside his decision-cycle and thus able to prevent him resisting effectively. 46 It would be anachronistic to say that Nelson understood combat in these terms. He naturally had no idea that he was conducting timecompetitive OODA Loops to get inside his enemys decision-cycle.…”