Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Domestic Consequences of International Efforts to Build Institutions

Buntaine, Mark T.; Parks, Bradley C.; Buch, Benjamin P.

doi:10.1093/isq/sqx013

Cited by 43 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 77 publications

(80 reference statements)

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“…All stakeholders have incentives to participate in this market. Donors want to report back concrete results to their communities and should hence be willing to invest into reliable information (Buntaine, Parks and Buch, 2017). Local beneficiaries have incentives to participate in this market and to report truthfully.…”

Section: Coordination Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid

Reinsberg

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Blockchain technology has been considered a vehicle to foster development in poor countries by promoting applications such as secure delivery of humanitarian aid, digital identity services, and proof of provenance. This article examines whether (and if so, how) blockchain technology can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign aid governance, thereby moving beyond completely anonymous contexts. Foreign aid governance is plagued by lack of credible commitments among states, which are further exacerbated by information asymmetries and which often undermine aid effectiveness. In this context, blockchain technology holds two promises. First, through the guaranteed execution of smart contracts, it can strengthen the credibility of state commitments, for example collective burden-sharing rules among a group of donors or recipient country compliance with policy conditionality in return for aid. Second, through leveraging prediction markets, blockchain technology can allay information problems related to the verification of real-world events along the entire aid delivery chain.

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Section: Coordination Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid

Reinsberg

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

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“…All these controls do not mean that this analysis can speak to what might occur in a randomly selected country, however. Donor aid delivery strategies are endogenous to features of recipient country environments (e.g., Allen & Flynn, ; Buntaine, Buch, and Parks ; Bush, ; Dietrich, ). Larger World Bank field offices and Country Directors are found in countries that are more strategically important to the organization.…”

Section: Empirics: Data and Hypothesis Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information, power, and location: World Bank staff decentralization and aid project success

Honig

2020

Governance

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Using data on World Bank staff identity and field placement, this article examines the relationship between staff presence in recipient countries and aid project performance. I find that merely placing World Bank staff in developing countries has little effect on the success of development projects. Greater field decision rights are, however, associated with differential project performance. In the most fragile states, the presence of senior personnel (World Bank Country Directors) is associated with greater project success after the “Strategic Compact” increased Country Directors' power. However—consistent with a bargaining model in which greater World Bank authority is in tension with recipient country direction of projects—as countries become less fragile, the net effect of the presence of Country Directors becomes negative. The impact of World Bank staff decentralization is mixed and appears to be driven primarily by the power of senior personnel in the field, not the ability of field staff to gather local information.

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“…Hall et al (2010), Dias & Tebaldi (2012) and Kim et al, (2012) point out the effect of institutions, human capital and capital stock on innovation. Kim et al (2012) highlight that patent protection is a key element for innovation of developed countries, but not in developing countries (Borges, Saucedo-Acosta & Diaz, 2017), because institutions of developing countries benefit only a small group of people (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012;Buntaine et al, 2017), and lack a reliable and secure regulatory framework for agents involved in the various economic processes (Borges, Saucedo-Acosta & Diaz, 2017).…”

Section: Empirical Studies Of Institutions and Other Macroeconomic Dementioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Varieties of Capitalism on the Relationship of Institutional Gearing and Economic Growth

Borges

Acosta

Diaz-Pedroza

2020

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The ways the firm solves coordination problems with the different stakeholders (or the varieties of capitalism of nations) affect economic performance. Institutional gearing is one of the main determinants of economic growth. Nevertheless, there are no studies that analyse the effect of varieties of capitalism on the relationship of institutional gearing and economic growth. The objective of the paper is to estimate the effect of the variety of capitalism on the relationship between the institutional gearing index and other macroeconomic control variables on the GDP per capita in a group of developed and developing countries. To do that 3 panel data models were estimated: one with fixed effects and two with random effects, for 31 countries for the period 2011-2015. We used 16 Coordinated Market Economies and Liberal Market Economies and 15 Hierarchical Market Economies. The results showed the varieties of capitalism affect the relationship between institutional gearing and economic growth. In the Coordinated Market Economies and Liberal Market Economies this effect is higher than in Hierarchical Market Economies. Governments of Hierarchical Market Economies should not only apply public policies to build functional institutions, but also encourage the positive complementarities among them.

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Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Domestic Consequences of International Efforts to Build Institutions

Cited by 43 publications

References 77 publications

Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid

Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid

Information, power, and location: World Bank staff decentralization and aid project success

The Effect of Varieties of Capitalism on the Relationship of Institutional Gearing and Economic Growth

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