Aiming at Aptness

Schechter, Joshua

doi:10.1017/epi.2019.35

Cited by 14 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…60 For a recent defense of the idea that inquiry is knowledge-aimed, within a wider knowledge-first virtue epistemology, see Kelp (2021). 61 Cf., Schechter (2019) for criticism. 62 Unless, of course, time is expiring.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust as performance

Carter

2022

Philosophical Issues

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It is argued that trust is a performative kind and that the evaluative normativity of trust is a special case of the evaluative normativity of performances generally.The view is shown to have advantages over competitor views, e.g., according to which good trusting is principally a matter of good believing (e.g., Hieronymi, 2008;McMyler, 2011), or good affect (e.g., Baier, 1986;Jones, 1996), or good conation (e.g., Holton, 1994). Moreover, the view can be easily extended to explain good (and bad) distrust, where the latter is understood as aimed (narrow-scoped) forbearance from trusting. The overarching framework-which assimilates the evaluative norms of trusting (and distrusting) to performancetheoretic norms-supplies us with an entirely new lens to view traditional philosophical problems about what is involved in trusting and distrusting well and badly, and thus, places our capacity to make progress on problems in this area on a new footing.

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Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust as performance

Carter

2022

Philosophical Issues

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“…3) for a helpful development of this idea. For criticism seeSchechter (2019).27 For a discussion on this point, seeSosa (2020, 29) and also(2015,.28(Sosa 2015, 166).…”

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Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology

Carter¹

2022

Social Virtue Epistemology

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A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist's 'knowledge = apt belief ' template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level-viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views-viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts-of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgmentfocused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016).

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A Telic Theory of Trust

Carter

2024

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What is it to trust well? How do we do it? If we think of trust as a kind of aimed performance, capable not only of success but also of competence and aptness, we can put our understanding of what it is to trust well on an entirely new footing. This book takes this project up, and in doing so, it uses the core ‘trust as performance’ idea—which is developed and refined in substantive detail—in the service of explaining a range of philosophically important phenomena related to trust, including its nature and varieties, the evaluative norms that govern good trusting and distrusting (both implicit and deliberative), how trust relates to vulnerability, risk, negligence, and monitoring, as well as to trustworthiness and, more generally, to our practices of cooperation. The result, a telic theory of trust, opens up entirely new option space and a research agenda in the philosophy of trust that is methodologically in the spirit of virtue epistemology, but which takes on its own distinctive shape.

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Aiming at Aptness

Cited by 14 publications

References 23 publications

Trust as performance

Trust as performance

Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology

A Telic Theory of Trust

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