AI-Testimony, Conversational AIs and Our Anthropocentric Theory of Testimony

Abstract

The ability to interact in a natural language completely changes devices' interfaces and potential applications of speaking technologies. Concurrently, this phenomenon challenges our mainstream theories of knowledge, such as how to analyze linguistic outputs of devices under existing anthropocentric theoretical assumptions. In section 1, I present the topic of machines that speak, connecting between Descartes and Generative AI. In section 2, I argue that accepted testimonial theories of knowledge and justification commonly reject the possibility that a speaking technological artifact can give testimony. In section 3, I identify three assumptions underlying the view that rejects conversational AIs -AI-based technologies that converse, as testifiers: conversational AIs (1) lack intentions; (2) cannot be normatively assessed; and (3) cannot constitute an object in trust relations; while humans can. In section 4, I propose the concept 'AI-Testimony' for analyzing outputs of conversational AIs, suggesting three conditions for technologies to deliver AI-testimony: (1) content is propositional; (2) generated and delivered with no other human directly involved;(3) the output is perceived as phenomenologically similar to that of a human. I conclude that this concept overcomes the limitations of the anthropocentric concept of testimony, opening future directions of research without associating conversational AIs human-like agency.