Agricultural Property Rights and Political Change in Nicaragua

Abstract

This study focuses on Nicaragua's transition from a revolutionary state to one oriented toward democracy and the market, through the political lens of agricultural property rights. The national agenda on property rights after 1990 was dominated by elaborate arrangements to accommodate kinship‐based factions of the agroindustrial elite, core Sandinista constituents, rural labor groups, and demobilized peasant combatants. Bargains, legislative initiatives, and constitutional reforms failed to clarify legal ambiguity over coveted assets. Persistent conflict thereby became embedded in official efforts to design a robust property regime. The case of Nicaragua suggests comparisons with other countries where protracted confrontation and social violence over property rights pose serious threats to unconsolidated democratic institutions.

Is World Bank “Good Governance” Good for the Poor? Central American Experiences

“…13) Political and economic power are, of course, always linked to some degree. Here, I argue that Central America's governments have been particularly vulnerable to the influences of specific economic elite groups, who have formed powerful kinship networks that operate simultaneously in private and public spheres (Everingham 2001). bureaucratic regulations, and corruption that inhibit their entrepreneurial initiatives (World Bank 1989. This analysis, however, does not consider adequately fluid ties between public and private actors, whether based on social class, culture, institutions, or kinship.…”

“…The grassroots activists interviewed, however, also detail instances in which the well-off employ powerful kinship, social, and political networks that extend across public and private sectors to reinforce their private power and wealth (Everingham 2001;Paige 1998). In struggles to influence government policies and gain access to state-administered resources, the wealthy employ income and assets, largely accumulated in the private sector, to hire lawyers, absorb the costs of complex bureaucratic procedures, and in some instances, bribe government officials in ways that the poor cannot.…”

What Is Governance in the ‘Public Interest’? The Case of the 1995 Property Forum in Post‐conflict Nicaragua

“…A revolutionary movement had deposed the dictator Anastacio Somoza in 1979 and brought the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) to power. The FSLN government was debilitated throughout the 1980s by a civil war that had its origins in ideological differences but was multi‐class in character (Everingham 2001). The war caused 30,000 deaths and severe economic and social disruption (Arnson 1999).…”

Why Nicaraguan Peasants Stay in Agricultural Production Cooperatives

“…However, the peasants were encouraged to join agricultural production cooperatives (APCs) rather than use the allocated plots for individual farming. The Sandinista policies thus led to the creation of large agricultural cooperatives in place of former privately owned estates and did relatively little to enlarge and strengthen the sector of family farms (Baumeister 1998;Everingham 2001). In the best socialist tradition, cooperatives enjoyed generous support under the Sandinista government.…”