Aggressive Police Leaders and the Strategic Choice of Overpolicing

Abstract

Does the selection of aggressive leaders within the police contribute to overpolicing? Contrary to prevailing assumptions, I argue that police officers follow directions from aggressive leaders, causing the adoption of overpolicing as a strategic choice. Leveraging a unique dataset comprising commanding officers’ histories of aggression and precinct outcomes within the New York Police Department, I employ first-difference models to analyze the impact of aggressive leaders on officers behavior. In line with the theoretical prediction, I find that commanding officers with a history of substantiated misconduct allegations increase the total number of stops and arrests, with no discernible impact on public safety. I investigate two avenues for curbing the influence of aggressive leaders; 1) leader selection and 2) reform. Current leader selection strategies fail as a check against aggressive policing, since data on all NYPD-officers show that officers with substantiated misconduct allegations are more likely to ascend to leadership roles. However, a reform of police stops reduced the influence of commanding officers with aggressive histories.