Aggregation in an Infinite, Relativistic Universe

Abstract

Aggregative moral theories face a series of devastating problems when we apply them in a physically realistic setting. According to current physics, our universe is likely infinitely large, and will contain infinitely many morally valuable events. But standard aggregative theories are ill-equipped to compare outcomes containing infinite total value. So, applied in a realistic setting, they cannot compare any outcomes a real-world agent must ever choose between. This problem has been discussed extensively, and non-standard aggregative theories proposed to overcome it. This paper addresses a further problem of similar severity. Physics tells us that, in our universe, how remotely in time an event occurs is relative. But our most promising aggregative theories, designed to compare outcomes containing infinitely many valuable events, are sensitive to how remote in time those events are. As I show, the evaluations of those theories are then relative too. But this is absurd; evaluations of outcomes must be absolute! So we must reject such theories. Is this objection fatal for all aggregative theories, at least in a relativistic universe like ours? I demonstrate here that, by further modifying these theories to fit with the physics, we can overcome it.

Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages

“…They are therefore not equivalence relations, and cannot be used to partition a population into subpopulations. 8 Analogous relativity-based objections can be raised to other views that give normative significance to facts about temporal order and duration-for instance, views that incorporate a pure rate of time preference (Cowen 2007, p. 10) and various time-sensitive views in infinite ethics (Cain, 1995, p. 404;Wilkinson, forthcoming).…”