Aggregating Moral Preferences

Adler, Matthew D.

doi:10.1017/s0266267115000486

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In a society in which every representative allocation is equally important and the value under dispute is equal to x (captured by m), independently of the preferences that each individual can have regarding altruism and self-interest, the agent in the dictator position should obtain at most the resource share sdm, and leave the remaining for the receiver. In this sense, a share of the resource above sdm is not compatible with the aggregated norms and the moral of the society that the representative dictator or social planner expresses (Adler, 2016; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Dalbert, 1999).…”

Section: The Mean Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Behavioural Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game

Osório

2018

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article attempts to explain the behaviour observed in the dictator game without explicitly assuming a utility function. Alternatively, I consider the repre- sentative behaviour of a society composed of heterogeneous individuals in terms of altruism and self-interest. Based on these two principles, I present an allocation that aggregates the society's preferences. The result depends crucially on the value of the resource under dispute for the dictator. Even if the value of the resource is extremely important for the dictator, the dictator cannot justify a share of the resource larger than 3/4 of the total. An allocation proposing more than this share of the resource cannot reach social consensus. On the other extreme, if the value of the resource is sufficiently unimportant for the society, an equal split of the resource emerges in the limit.

show abstract

Section: The Mean Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These principles are chosen because most of the behaviour observed in the dictator game is explained and driven by these principles. Consequently, an allocation rule that aggregates these moral preferences emerges (Adler, 2016; Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Konow, 2005; List & Polak, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Behavioural Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game

Osório

2018

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Based on research into best practices for creating these positive dimensions of students’ lives, positive education builds on students’ strengths to encourage development in the five key areas Seligman summarizes with the acronym PERMA. Adler (2016) provides one example of how this can work. He describes a curriculum he developed with colleagues in Bhutan, one designed to develop gratitude, empathy, mindfulness, and other life skills that positive psychologists claim increase well-being.…”

Section: Question Four: Life Purpose and Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Educating for Comprehensive Well-being

Wortham

Love-Jones

Peters

et al. 2020

ECNU Review of Education

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose: Educational approaches that advocate “well-being,” the “whole child,” “social and emotional learning,” “character,” and the like emphasize human development beyond the acquisition of knowledge and skills. These approaches vary widely in their views of human nature, their visions of a good life, and their prescriptions for educational practice. This article maps out heterogeneous contemporary approaches to “well-being” and related constructs, thereby allowing researchers, educators, and policymakers to understand the divergent assumptions made by the proliferating approaches to education that go beyond academics. Design/Approach/Methods: This article presents results from a 2-year project, which included interviews with advocates of different approaches and review of key literature about eleven educational approaches to “well-being,” the “whole child,” “social and emotional learning,” “character,” and similar noncognitive ends. Findings: The article argues that any educational approach to “well-being” and related constructs must respond to four questions: whether humans are bundles of discrete competencies or integrated wholes, what the appropriate relation is between individuals and society, the relative importance of instrumental and intrinsic goals, and the importance of an overarching purpose for one’s life. The analysis reviews how eleven contemporary approaches address these four questions. Originality/Value: Despite the global proliferation of divergent approaches to “well-being,” the “whole child,” “social and emotional learning,” “character,” and related constructs in education, there are no comprehensive frameworks for understanding the alternatives and their key assumptions. This article organizes the globally proliferating educational movements that promote “well-being,” making sense of a confusing set of alternatives. We also argue that any comprehensive approach to education that goes beyond academics must consider the four questions that we identify.

show abstract

“…Given that PFC fails, the EP theorist cannot simply identify the overall well‐being ordering with the shared preference ordering of all individuals; she must instead have some way of aggregating extended preferences into a single well‐being ordering. This is easier said than done, for reasons related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem (Arrow ()); the challenge is discussed in detail by Adler () and by ourselves in other work (Greaves and Lederman ()). For the remainder of this paper, however, we will suppose that a reasonable aggregation rule can be found, and develop a different kind of problem for the EP program.…”

Section: The Principle Of Full Coincidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being

Greaves

Lederman

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An important objection to preference‐satisfaction theories of well‐being is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well‐being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi () attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so‐called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference‐satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We argue that making conceptual sense of extended preferences is less problematic than others have supposed, but that even so extended preferences do not provide a promising way for the preference satisfaction theorist to make interpersonal well‐being comparisons. Our main objection takes the form of a trilemma: depending on how the theory based on extended preferences is developed, either (a) the result will be inconsistent with ordinary preference‐satisfaction theory, or (b) it will fail to recover sufficiently rich interpersonal well‐being comparisons, or (c) it will take on a number of other arguably odd and undesirable commitments.

show abstract

Aggregating Moral Preferences

Cited by 6 publications

References 35 publications

A Behavioural Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game

A Behavioural Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game

Educating for Comprehensive Well-being

Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About