Agentive Duality reconsidered

Abstract

A growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a dual, i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to necessity as ability stands to possibility. We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it sits uneasily with a wide range of alternative proposals which are unified by the idea that ability requires control. In particular, we show that against the background of a control requirement on ability, Agentive Duality can be used to derive absurd predictions featuring this dual. Far from being a purely definitional thesis, Agentive Duality thus affords a new lens through which to assess the long-standing debate between possibility analyses of ability and their discontents.

Chance, ability, and control

“…Fusco (2020) argues that 'accidental, or fluky, success is insufficient for ascriptions of ability'. Loets and Zakkou (2022) identify the claim that ability requires control as being at the root of a wide range of philosophical views about ability and judgments (though they do not themselves commit to it).…”

Adaptive abilities

“…It is this element of control that has created problems for a simple understanding of ability possession as a form of possibility, which would be initially suggested by the fact that we can ascribe abilities with the modal auxiliary ‘can’ (Kratzer, 1977; Lewis, 1976). Possibilities need not involve the sort of control required for ability; for instance, anything that an agent does it was possible for them to do, but not everything an agent does is under their control and an exercise of their ability (Kenny, 1976; Loets & Zakkou, 2022; Kikkert, 2022).…”