Agent selection and threat actualization in contamination cases: Predicting action from perpetrator behavior.

Abstract

While existing research on the topic is sparse, previous works have shown that there is believed to be a substantial threat of intentional, malicious contamination of the supply chain by criminals and terrorists (CFSAN, 2001; WHO, 2008). Genuine contamination incidents have the potential to result in mass casualties, although empty threats are often enough to generate public fear and lead to considerable economic damage. While empty threats often appear indistinguishable from those which will result in contamination, it is thought that certain variables identified in perpetrator communications may be able to help separate empty threats from those which will be actualized. This research thus attempts to determine whether a perpetrator's reported choice of agent could offer functional predictions for the likelihood of actual contamination in future incidents. Findings indicate that chemical agents alone are more likely to be associated with genuine contamination, while the claimed use of biological agents alone as well as chemical, biological and radionuclear (CBRN) agents combined are more often associated with empty threats. The utility of these findings will be discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.

Poisoning expertise and outcomes in malicious contamination incidents

“…In total, the proportion of cases involving these biological agents was higher for threats and hoaxes than actual cases of contamination, and this was true for both experts and non-experts. This seems to be consistent with past literature, which shows that biological and particularly concerning agents are more likely to be used during threats and hoaxes (Kilbane, (in press)), and that concerning agents may be particularly useful in eliciting fear (Sparks and Shepherd, 1994). In addition, in the case of hoaxes and threats it takes only knowledge of the poison’s existence and usefulness in eliciting fear for a perpetrator to claim the use of such an agent.…”

“…Finally, in less than 15 per cent of non-expert and 10 per cent of expert cases the actual agent used was either unknown or unreported, which could have a relatively minor impact on some of the other agents categories discussed. While examining these agents in more specific detail could provide a better understanding of agent choice among experts and non-experts, it is first important to consider the distinction between cases of actual contamination and threats or hoaxes, as different desired outcomes may require the use of different agents (Dalziel, 2009; Tishler, 2013; Kilbane, (in press)), regardless of the perpetrator’s knowledge.…”

“…Indeed, the notion that an ideal poison is one which may go undetected (Trestrail, 2007), is of no use to an extortionist or a terrorist who is attempting to gain attention for their cause through the use of a threat or hoax. In an attempt to gain such attention, threateners or hoaxers may even claim to have used particularly fear-inducing agents, regardless of whether they have access to or knowledge of such agents (Carus, 2002; Cornish, 2007; Kilbane, in press). Therefore, it is imperative not only to determine what agents are used by experts in comparison to non-experts, but also to consider the assumed goal of the act, whether that be to injure many or to simply generate public fear.…”