Agent Reliabilism

Abstract

In this paper I will argue for a position I call "agent reliabilism". My strategy for doing this will be in two parts. In Part One of the paper I review two skeptical arguments from Hume, and I argue that they require us to adopt some form of reliabilism. The main idea is this: Hume's arguments show that there is no logical or quasi-logical relation between our empirical beliefs and their evidence. Put another way, the arguments show that if our evidence is indeed a reliable indication of the truth of our empirical beliefs, then this is at most a contingent fact about human cognition, rather than a function of any necessary relations, deductive or inductive, between evidence and belief. Therefore, in order to avoid skepticism about empirical knowledge, we must adopt an epistemology that allows empirical knowledge to be based on evidence that is merely contingently reliable. In other words, we must adopt some form of reliabilism.In Part Two of the paper I argue that agent reliabilism solves two widely recognized problems for simple reliabilism, or the position that knowledge is true belief grounded in reliable cognitive processes. The first is "The Problem of Strange and Fleeting Processes." There are a number of counter-examples which show that simple reliabilism is too weak, since not all reliable processes give rise to knowledge. Namely, strange and fleeting ones do not. For this reason reliabilism must somehow restrict the kinds of process that are relevant for generating knowledge. The second problem for simple reliabilism is the persistent intuition that knowledge requires subjective justification. One way that this problem has been pressed against reliabilism is in the demand that knowers be somehow sensitive to the reliability of their evidence. It is not enough, the objection goes, that one's beliefs are in fact based on reliable grounds. Rather, one must be, in some relevant sense, aware that this is so. I will argue that agent reliabilism has resources for addressing both these problems.If the argument of Part One is correct, then to avoid skepticism we have to be reliabilists. If the argument of Part Two is correct, then we have to be agent reliabilists. That position would therefore describe a general framework for any adequate theory of knowledge. In the course of the discussion it will also

Augmented Reality : Reflections on its Contribution to Knowledge Formation

“… The problem of induction is wellknown. We form our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact and the external world on the basis of evidenceprovided by past and present observations and sensory appearances, respectively.Inorder for the support relations between our empirical and perceptual beliefs and the evidenceo ffered in their support to be necessary,wea lso need the further assumptions that the future will resemble the past and that sensory appearances arereliable indications to reality,r espectively.The problem is that both of these assumptions relyfor their support on what they assert.C onsequently, givent hat circular reasoning is invalid, there aren on ecessary support relations between our empirical beliefs and the evidenceo fferedi n their support.Accordingly,the conclusion that has been traditionallydrawn is that our empirical and perceptual beliefs cannot amount to knowledge.F or mored etails on how to reconstruct Hume'ss kepticism alongt hese lines,s ee Greco (1999).…”

“…Fora noverview of process reliabilism see (Goldmanand Beddor 2015). Foranumber of arguments against the view and whyvirtue reliabilism is to be preferred see (Greco 1999, Pritchard 2010P alermos 2014b).  The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the writings of (Sosa 1988(Sosa , 1993 and Plantinga (1993aPlantinga ( ,1993b.…”

“… The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the writings of (Sosa 1988(Sosa , 1993 and Plantinga (1993aPlantinga ( ,1993b. Form orer ecent approaches to this intuition, see Greco (1999Greco ( ,2 004,2 007, 2010 and Pritchard( 2009Pritchard( ,2 010a, 2010bPritchard( , 2010.…”

Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths

“…14 In addition, and significantly, Pritchard adopts a central feature of virtue epistemology as practiced by Sosa (2007), Zagzebski (1999), and, most especially, Greco (1999Greco ( , 2000. We take these rejoinders in turn.…”

Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology

“…See for example [Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2001]. 10 For example, in the development of process reliabilism [Goldman 1979] and [Goldman 1986]; virtue epistemology [Greco 1999], [Greco 2000], [Zagzebski 1996]; modal anti-luck epistemologies [Dretske 1971] and [Nozick 1981] for Sensitivity based accounts; [Sosa 1999], [Pritchard 2005] and [Pritchard 2007] for Safety based accounts, etc. 11 See for example [DeRose and Warfield 1999]; [Greco 2009]. knowledge, therefore, it is unlucky true belief.…”