Agent Causation and Theism

Griffith, Meghan

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.003.0011

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“…2 See Griffith (2016) for an overview of compelling responses to typical complaints against the view. 3 Frankfurt himself was skeptical of The Causal Theory (see 1988, chap 6.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It obviously vindicates the thought that the agent is the one who exercises agency. But the typical version of this view does so by making the agent an irreducible substance cause (Griffith, 2016, p. 73). This irreducibility amounts to saying that, in some sense, agents are metaphysically fundamental.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22See Griffith (2016) for an overview of compelling responses to typical complaints against the view.…”

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Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Wallace

2023

Philosophical Issues

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The standard event‐causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event‐causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent‐mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event‐causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event‐causal answers to the agent‐mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event‐casual view. The paper concludes with a burden‐shifting argument against emergentist agent‐causal theories and non‐reductive event‐causal theories of agency.

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“…2 See Griffith (2016) for an overview of compelling responses to typical complaints against the view. 3 Frankfurt himself was skeptical of The Causal Theory (see 1988, chap 6.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Wallace

2023

Philosophical Issues

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“…But of course, this motivation is undermined if there are reductive views that can adequately respond to Velleman's concerns. Velleman and others do offer such attempts, but it remains to be seen whether these attempts are suffi cient (for arguments against the success of reductive attempts see Griffi th 2016).…”

Section: Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Timpe

Griffith

Levy³

2016

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Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers, in theology and in non-western traditions as much as in contemporary academic philosophy. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the fi rst to draw together leading experts on every aspect of the debate, from those who are central to the current philosophical debate, to non-western perspectives, scientifi c contributions, and the rich history of the debate. Its 61 chapters, commissioned especially for this volume from the world's leading researchers, are framed by a General Introduction and brief section introductions for each of the six sections. A list of References, an annotated Further Reading list, and a short list of Related Topics are included at the end of each chapter.Kevin Timpe holds the W. H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin College. He has published a number of books on free will, including

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Agent Causation and Theism

Cited by 2 publications

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Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

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