Agent and stewardship behavior: How do they differ?

Martin, John A.; Butler, Frank C.

doi:10.1017/jmo.2016.72

Cited by 28 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…However, our research shows that managers did the opposite and compared their firm to better performing firms. Our result is more consistent with stewardship theory than with agency theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Martin & Butler, 2017). The upward comparison may be due to a motivation for self-improvement, which dominates self-protection motivation.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Looking backward through the looking glass: Reference groups and social comparison

Lee

Rhee²,

Park³

2018

Journal of Management & Organization

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Scholars often assume that reference groups are industry-wide, homogeneous, and stable. We examine this assumption and suggest hypotheses based on managers’ motivations such as self-enhancement and self-improvement, social identity, and affiliation-based impression management. We test hypotheses on failure-induced changes in reference groups and their direction in terms of upward and downward comparisons. An empirical examination of changes in reference groups for firms listed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index between 1993 and 2008 shows that performance below social aspirations induces changes in reference groups and toward upward comparisons. The results indicate that managers can choose to change the reference group – a cognition-centered response – as an alternative to such action-centered responses as organizational search and risk-taking in response to poor performance from social aspirations and that upward comparisons may be the result of social performance shortfalls to give a better impression and to improve firm performance.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Looking backward through the looking glass: Reference groups and social comparison

Lee

Rhee²,

Park³

2018

Journal of Management & Organization

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“…Sustainable innovation capability is especially important for companies in an intense global competition environment. Board leadership structure of CEO duality makes managers of Chinese private listed companies tend to implement relatively positive innovation strategies based on the mentality of stewardship, and have higher autonomy in strategic decision-making [44,45]. Director compensation incentive can alleviate the risk-aversion tendency of board members in innovation decision-making and improve their innovation initiative [46].…”

Section: Mediating Role Of Sustainable Innovation Capabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Board Governance, Sustainable Innovation Capability and Corporate Expansion: Empirical Data from Private Listed Companies in China

Bai

2019

Sustainability

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Within fierce market competition, economic integration acceleration, information technology development, customer demands that are more complex than ever before and product life cycle acceleration have greatly increased the complexity and uncertainty of the operating environment of Chinese private listed companies. Considering the special situation and the current situation of the enterprise development phase in China, the shaping and upgrading of sustainable innovation capability for Chinese private listed companies has become an important issue of common concern in academia and practice. Using 4833 sets of data from private listed companies in China in four consecutive years, we studied the relationship between board governance, sustainable innovation capability and firm expansion empirically based on stewardship theory and principal-agent theory. The results show that centralized leadership structure formed by chief executive officer (CEO) duality has a positive effect on the sustainable innovation capability of Chinese listed companies; director compensation incentive has a positive impact on the sustainable innovation capability of Chinese listed companies; sustainable innovation capability has a positive effect on the firm expansion of Chinese listed companies; and centralized board leadership structure and director compensation incentive have a positive impact on the firm expansion of listed companies partially by improving the sustainable innovation capability.

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“…The conflict of interest emanating from the separation of management and ownership makes the likelihood of theft and other kinds of opportunistic behaviour common in small businesses, which are likely to have less formal mechanisms of control than their larger counterparts (Chrisman et al 2004). However, as the survival of such small businesses often depends on the actions and decisions of a handful of managers and owners, the effect of any opportunistic behaviour by them is proportionally higher (Chrisman et al 2004;Martin & Butler 2017). Good examples of opportunistic behaviour are fraud, falsehood and larceny.…”

Section: Problem Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The perceived impact of agency control on the performance of Zimbabwean small-to-medium enterprises

Mashavira

2021

The Southern African Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Busi

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Background: Agency control has been studied in the context of large public listed businesses and is linked to business performance. However, very limited studies have validated such a role in small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), especially in a developing economy.Aim: The current study aimed at ezstablishing the perceived impact of agency control on performance, as measured by return on investment (ROI) and innovation in SMEs in Harare Province, Zimbabwe.Setting: Primary research was conducted amongst owners or managers of SMEs in Harare Province, Zimbabwe.Methods: The final sample consisted of 106 owners or managers of SMEs. The study was purely quantitative and adopted the survey design. Structured questionnaires were used for data collection.Results: The study established that the most used control mechanisms were frequent monitoring and face-to-face deliberations with subordinates. Weak and statistically insignificant relationships were found to exist between agency control and business performance measured by both ROI and innovation.Conclusion: It is best to solicit expert advice to coach owners or managers on how best agency control mechanisms could be formally instituted and managed to leverage on them.

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Agent and stewardship behavior: How do they differ?

Cited by 28 publications

References 41 publications

Looking backward through the looking glass: Reference groups and social comparison

Looking backward through the looking glass: Reference groups and social comparison

Board Governance, Sustainable Innovation Capability and Corporate Expansion: Empirical Data from Private Listed Companies in China

The perceived impact of agency control on the performance of Zimbabwean small-to-medium enterprises

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