Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An institutionalist perspective

Abstract

Abstract. The European Union has launched an impressive number of crisis management missions since its Common Security and Defence Policy became operational in 2003. This article analyses the agenda-setting phase of these civilian and military operations in order to explain why the EU has sent troops, policemen, judges, prosecutors and monitors across three continents. It presents an institutionalist perspective and argues that the former High Representative Javier Solana and his officials have been instrumental in putting various operations on the agenda. They have employed deliberate agenda-setting strategies, such as venue-shopping, conflict expansion and issue framing, to further their bureaucratic interest of launching new missions. Solana and his officials had the ability to affect the agenda-setting process due to their pivotal position in policy-making. This gave them with superior information on the state-of-play, an early mover advantage as well as strong international networks. The article provides empirical evidence from the crisis management missions in Aceh, Bosnia, Chad and Kosovo. It concludes with the changes to the Common Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy

“…Knowledge, skill, power and resources have since the Greek philosopher Plato been seen as crucial for leadership to function as a panacea to complex problems. In the EU, the individual factor has surfaced every time a new HR has been chosen (Dijkstra, ; Helwig, ). It was particularly vivid when Catherine Ashton was chosen as she was seen to be lacking the necessary skills and personality for the job (Howorth, ).…”

Allocating political attention in the EU’s foreign and security policy: The effect of supranational agenda-setters

“…However, the previous HR, Javier Solana, seems to have managed to do just that. Dijkstra (2012) argues that Solana and his officials were instrumental in putting various crisis management missions on the Council’s agenda; and they did so with less far-reaching powers and fewer resources available to them pre-Lisbon. In this light, the stark reduction in attention to the CSDP under Ashton might not be due to active efforts to keep crisis management operations off the agenda, but simply a result of not pursuing a similarly ambitious agenda in this area as her predecessor.…”

Turning an idea into reality: Creating the European Institute of Peace

“…Second, the article speaks to the literature on EU foreign policy-making, particularly to studies on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in European foreign policy (Bicchi, 2007;Joachim and Dembinski, 2011). Recently, a number of studies have made advances in relation to theorizing agenda-setting and framing in EU foreign policy and the role of NGOs in these processes (Dijkstra, 2012;Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013;Voltolini, 2016). This article illustrates that the concept of collective framing provides a fruitful avenue for further theorizing on the conditions under which framing processes occur and are successful.…”

“…Originally developed in the field of social movement studies, framing has gained widespread attention in European integration studies (cf. Princen, 2011), increasingly also in the context of agenda-setting within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Bicchi, 2007;Dijkstra, 2012;Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013;Voltolini, 2016). The term 'frame' goes back to the writings of Erving Goffman (1974: 21) to whom 'frames denote schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their lifespace'.…”