AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING POWER: The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations

Bennett, Douglas C.; Sharpe, Kenneth Evan

doi:10.1515/9781400858217.209

Cited by 10 publications

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“…The understanding of the concept of power is built largely around the work of Bennett & Sharpe (1979). The relative power of actors should not be gauged merely from the bargaining outcome.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The relative power of actors should not be gauged merely from the bargaining outcome. Such post hoc analysis of power excludes any meaningful analysis of why a particular outcome occurred and forecloses the possibility that one party had potential power it did not exercise (Bennett & Sharpe, 1979). Moreover, Bennett & Sharpe (1979: 75) argue that MNCs' "power resources are not entirely interchangeable from context to context, or from contest to contest.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This myopia arises partly from the strictly dyadic character of the standard pluralist conception of power ('A has power over B'). Such an approach abstracts the actors from all other significant relationships in which they are engaged, and thus seeks to locate bargaining power apart from these other significant relationships (Bennett & Sharpe, 1979). Instead, what is needed is an understanding of how an actor's power is shaped by the complex web of relationships -with actors not directly party to the bargaining in which the two parties are enmeshed.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

Vivoda

2011

Bus. polit.

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This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

Vivoda

2011

Bus. polit.

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“…Bennett and Sharpe (1979) found that Mexico's bargaining power was strongest at time of entry because the automotive MNEs desired access to the HC market. Once the MNEs had become integrated into the host economy and developed strong relationships with local upstream and downstream firms, MNE bargaining power increased rather than obsolesced.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 See, for example, Vernon (1971Vernon ( , 1977, Moran (1973), Bennett and Sharpe (1979), Jenkins (1986), Kobrin (1987), Brewer (1992), Grosse and Behrman (1992), Vachani (1995) and Grosse (1996). 3 Without specifying a length of time required to attain insider status, iterative bargaining assumes some gap between the initial and later rounds of investment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Insiders, outsiders and host country bargains

Eden

Molot

2002

Journal of International Management

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The obsolescing bargain (OB) model analyzes bargaining between a host country (HC) government and a multinational enterprise (MNE) at time of entry and the circumstances under which the original bargain does or does not erode over time. The model has traditionally focused on the dyadic relationship between the MNE and nation state. However, if a second wave of foreign multinationals should enter the HC, the relationship is no longer dyadic but trilateral: the host government, the first mover firms and the latecomers. What happens to the original and to subsequent MNE -state bargains? We incorporate recent insights on the liability of foreignness, transaction cost economics, multimarket competition and the resource-based view (RBV) into a theoretical model of sequential entry by rival multinationals. We find that liability of foreignness, firm rivalry and governance inseparability are key factors determining winners and losers in the sequential bargains. International institutions and home country governments are external forces that can also affect bargaining outcomes. We test our model's propositions on a longitudinal case study of public policy decisions in the Canadian auto industry. D

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The Peripheral State Debate: State Capitalist and Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America

Canak

1984

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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In 1975 the Trilateral Commission published Crozier, Huntington, and Wantanuki's Crisis of Democracy, which questioned the compatibility of stable capitalist development and traditional democratic freedoms in the advanced capitalist nations, a theme echoed in Lindblom (1977), Lindberg et al. (1975), Nisbet (1975), and Huntington (1981). Living in capitalist societies whose recent experience is strikingly nondemocratic, Latin American scholars have felt most urgently the need to assess critically this contradiction and its implications for general political tendencies within the process of capitalist development. In the 1970s, directly in response to events in the major industrialized Latin American nations (especially Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), theoretical and empirical research has reformulated the terrain of debate regarding the relationship of political, economic, and social relations in peripheral capitalist nations. This new vocabulary and new set of hypotheses about state structure and state intervention suggest explanations for the nondemocratic political structure and the increasingly expansive and intensive role of the state in the process of capital accumulation in Latin America.

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AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING POWER: The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

Insiders, outsiders and host country bargains

The Peripheral State Debate: State Capitalist and Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America

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