Agenda Control and Reciprocity in Sequential Voting Decisions

Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon

doi:10.1111/ecin.12898

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 54 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…22 In Fischbacher & Schudy (2014), if given the choice, voters favoring the first issues prefer to vote sequentially issue-by-issue rather than over the whole bundle. In Fischbacher & Schudy (2020), agenda setters choose to put their preferred issues at the beginning of the sequence of issues voted upon.…”

Section: Implicit Logrolling and Bundlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Casella

Macé

2021

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others’ votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare improving or welfare decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling, the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions—that is, allowing one to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

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Section: Implicit Logrolling and Bundlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Casella

Macé

2021

Annu. Rev. Econ.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Fischbacher & Schudy (2014), if given the choice, voters favoring the first issues prefer to vote sequentially issue-by-issue rather than over the whole bundle. InFischbacher & Schudy (2020), agenda setters choose to put their preferred issues at the beginning of the sequence of issues voted upon.23 Note that the example departs from the environment described above because of the asymmetry in voter 3's preferences.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare ?

Casella

Macé

2020

SSRN Journal

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Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling-the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions-to trade votes with oneself only-such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

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“…To be precise, in the paper, the number of proposals voted upon at each period corresponds to the size of a minimal winning coalition, but this does not change the nature of the argument.23 InFischbacher & Schudy (2014), if given the choice, voters favoring the first issues prefer to vote sequentially issue-by-issue rather than over the whole bundle. InFischbacher & Schudy (2020), agenda setters choose to put their preferred issues at the beginning of the sequence of issues voted upon.24 Note that the example departs from the environment described above because of the asymmetry in voter 3's preferences.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%