Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution.In this paper we will be concerned with the problem of self-identification as it arises in the domain of action, which we will take to include both overt and covert or simulated actions.Talk of a problem of identification presupposes a contrast set, and the possibility that, in seeking to identify one self, one picks out something in the contrast set instead. With self-identification, two contrast sets must be considered: the world at large and the set of other selves. The problem of self-identification therefore divides into two sub-problems: self-world discrimination and self-other discrimination. We focus here on the latter problem. Our first aim is to show that there is a problem of self-other discrimination. Our second aim is to discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases.In the first section, we will examine some of the reasons why philosophers have paid little attention to the problem of self-other discrimination, and investigate the conditions under which this problem can arise. In section 2, we will concentrate on the identification of the self as a physical body. In section 3, we will present evidence that we are able to perceive the intentions of others. This will involve the idea of shared representations of actions, the nature and format of which we willWe would like to thank Tim Bayne, Jérôme Dokic, Pierre Jacob, Joëlle Proust, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, and the participants at the Workshop on Simulation held in Paris in May 2003 for discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper. We are especially indebted to Gregory Currie for his penetrating and helpful comments and suggestions on multiple drafts of this paper.

Agency, gait and self-consciousness

“…This incorrect gait agency during goal-directed locomotion and navigation suggests that the conscious monitoring of an agent's moving body is not reliable and that the generation of full-body locomotion and the building of a conscious experience of it are distinct brain processes. The value of 10-15°above which angular biases during cyclic locomotion were more often correctly perceived than not by our participants (no selfattribution) was compatible with earlier work on agency for goaldirected hand and arm movements (thresholds of 6.5°-15°; Farrer et al, 2003;Franck et al, 2001;Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004;Posada et al, 2007;Slachevsky et al, 2001;Synofzik et al, 2006).…”

Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration

“…On the other hand, the SoO results from the multisensory integration of inputs coming from different modalities (e.g., from vision and proprioception) (Ehrsson, 2012). There is a partial overlap between the factors that determine the SoA and those involved in the SoO and, in ordinary situations and some neurological conditions, such as somatoparaphrenia, there is a close interplay between the SoA and the SoO (Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004, de Vignemont, 2009). Nonetheless, we can find striking dissociations between these two feelings, with a preserved SoO despite an impaired SoA, both in schizophrenic patients (Frith, 2005) and in healthy subjects (Kalckert et al, 2012).…”

Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language

“…Specifically, many misattributions depend on representations that underpin observed and imagined actions. Failure in the self-other discrimination used to ascribe the represented action to the correct subject may explain these striking facts (Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). Finally, normal subjects also make similar misattributions in everyday settings.…”