Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality

Abstract

It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessarily culminates in an ending. This claim is based on two false assumptions: that a life as a whole calls for narrative structure, and that narratives necessarily require closure as temporal endings. Second, I reject the proposal that temporal finitude is constitutive of the basic elements of diachronic agency, including the nature of deliberation and of our values. I argue that only finitude as scarcity of opportunities is constitutive of these elements. Additionally, scarcity might be present in an endless existence. Therefore, it is not incoherent to conceive of a recognizable and potentially desirable immortality that grounds the core features of diachronic agency. Thus, against the reconciliatory strategy, I conclude that we might never fully reconcile with mortality. Although we might embrace our inescapable mortality as essential to a fuller range of features of our existence, we can still justifiably regret our missing on an immortal existence.

Agency, narrative, and mortality

“…A defense of Williams suggests two possibilities: first, an endless life would be shapeless, and thus impossible to evaluate for its desirability (Altshuler, 2015c;Burley, 2009); second, the very values by means of which we evaluate lives are themselves constitutively dependent on mortal lives (Malpas, 1998;Nussbaum, 1989;Scheffler, 2013). Williams's critics respond that immortal lives need not be shapeless: they can gain a shape from their projects, which create their own (typically overlapping) narratives (Chappell, 2009;Ferrero, 2015;Fischer, 2009). These local narratives, in turn, can allow for the finitude necessary to sustain value.…”

Do immortals need an eject button? Sartre and the importance of always having an exit

“…Thus, without ever involving death in his account, Sartre manages to explain how other limitations that show up in life are sources of the same kinds of stakes and pressures that immortality curmudgeons demand from a truly meaningful existence (cf. Ferrero, 2015, pp. 362–364).…”

Halhatatlanság és unalom • Immortality and Boredom

“…Luca Ferrero, aki szintén úgy gondolja, hogy a trivialitásból vett érv nem bi zonyítja, hogy a halandóság konstitutív volna az emberi lét számára, az emberi élet folyását a következőképpen látja (Ferrero, 2015). Az életünk egy sajátos pá lyát ír le a számunkra lehetséges állapotok által kirajzolt térben, és ezt a pályát a döntéseink határozzák meg, és a lehetséges útvonalak alkotta hálózatnak vannak olyan részei, amelyek automatikusan elérhetetlenné válnak a döntéseink nyomán, és örökre elvesznek a lehetőségeink közül, függetlenül attól, hogy a jövőben mi lyen döntéseket hozunk majd, és így a lehetőség-költségek folyamatosan gyűlnek és gyűlnek, bármelyik ösvényt választjuk is.…”