1999
DOI: 10.1016/s1057-5219(99)00011-3
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Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making

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Cited by 142 publications
(121 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
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“…To sum up, institutional ownership ratio has a significantly negative relation with leverage which is in line with studies of Michaely and Vincent (2012), Tong and Ning (2004) and partial data of Crutchley et al (1999). Tangibility has a significantly negative relation in the sample which is not in line with trade-off theory since increase in tangibility is expected to ease increase in level of debt.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 70%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To sum up, institutional ownership ratio has a significantly negative relation with leverage which is in line with studies of Michaely and Vincent (2012), Tong and Ning (2004) and partial data of Crutchley et al (1999). Tangibility has a significantly negative relation in the sample which is not in line with trade-off theory since increase in tangibility is expected to ease increase in level of debt.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 70%
“…Based on the other proxies they conclude that firms with a low debt ratio tend to attract more institutional investors. Crutchley et al (1999) conduct their analysis only for two years. In 1987, they find significantly positive relation between debt as a dependent variable and institutional ownership as an independent variable.…”
Section: Empirical Findingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given the array of internal monitoring tools that can be used to resolve agency problems, owners of the firms can adopt a combination of these policies. This also implies that a firm's managerial ownership, leverage and dividends might be simultaneous and there is substitution effects between the three financial variables directly related to each other (Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 1992;Chen & Steiner, 1999;Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera, & Raymond, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This monitoring activity will reduce agency costs because it allows the company to use lower levels of debt (Isrina, 2006). According to Crutchley et al (1999), the effect of leverage on institutional ownership is positive. High leverage caused the company monitored by the debtholder lead managers to act in accordance with the debtholders and shareholders interest, so that this condition w attract the entry of institutional ownership.…”
Section: Interdependence Relationship Of Leverage and Institutional Omentioning
confidence: 99%