Agency problems and performance of Korean companies during the Asian financial crisis: Chaebol vs. non-chaebol firms

Kim, Byungmo; Lee, Inmoo

doi:10.1016/s0927-538x(03)00027-1

Cited by 68 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Large shareholders may have incentives to use their controlling position to extract private gains or benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, thus causing agency problems [50][51][52]. As such, it has been recognized that agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are more prevalent in Korea [53]. Unlike developed countries, such as U.S. and U.K., Korea has a relatively weak corporate governance system.…”

Section: The Effect Of Large Shareholder Ownership On the Relationshimentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea

2018

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This study examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value in the context of ownership structure. Specifically, our study explores whether large shareholder and foreign shareholder ownership play an important role in the CSR-firm value relationship. Using a sample of 48 firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) between 2010 and 2014, we find that CSR is positively associated with firm value. We further find that the relationship between CSR and firm value is weaker in firms with high large shareholder ownership than in firms with low large shareholder ownership. However, we find no evidence of the effect of foreign ownership on the relationship between CSR and firm value. This study sheds light on the importance of ownership structure in the relationship between CSR and firm value, suggesting significant implications for academics, practitioners, and policymakers. We contribute to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the effect of ownership structure on the CSR-firm value relationship. Policymakers may consider these results in implementing their policies that can enhance CSR activities.

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Section: The Effect Of Large Shareholder Ownership On the Relationshimentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea

2018

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“…11 Baek, Kang, and Park (2003) and Kim and Lee (2003) show that this was also the case for stock price performance during the crisis period.…”

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confidence: 90%

Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Kato

Kim²,

Lee³

2007

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm performance but also on Chaebol affiliation) for 246 firms that were included in KOSPI200 for at least two consecutive years from 1998 to 2001. Contrary to a popular belief that Korean corporate governance and the structure of Korean executive compensation is considerably different from elsewhere in the West, we find that cash compensation of Korean executives is statistically significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to stock market performance is comparable to the U.S. and Japan. Perhaps even more importantly, further analysis reveals for the first time that such overall significant executive pay-performance link is driven by nonChaebol firms and that no such link exists for Chaebol firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are aimed mostly at Chaebol firms. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: M52, M12, G30, G15, J33, O53

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“…Although the executive directors have specialized skills, expertise and valuable knowledge of the firms' operating policies and day-to-day activities, there is a need for the independent directors to contribute the fresh ideas, independence, objectivity and expertise gained from their own fields (Cho and Kim, 2003). Hence, the agency theory recommends the involvement of independent non-executive directors to monitor any self-interested actions by managers and to minimize agency costs (Florackis and Ozkan, 2004;Williams et al, 2006).…”

Section: Agency Theory and Board Compositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Corporate Governance on Social and Environmental Information Disclosure of Malaysian Listed Banks: Panel Data Analysis

Htay¹,

Rashid²,

Adnan³

et al. 2012

AJFA

124

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This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on social and environmental information disclosure of Malaysian listed banks by using a panel data analysis. The proxies for good corporate governance are board leadership structure, board composition, board size, director ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership. Social and environmental information disclosure index is developed and content analysis is conducted by cross checking between the social and environmental information disclosed in the annual reports and the disclosure index developed by the researcher. The disclosure score used in this study is weighted disclosure score after considering the opinions of accountants and financial analysts who represent preparers and users of the accounting information respectively. The findings show that smaller board size, higher percentage of independent directors (1%) on the board, higher board size (1%), higher percentage of director ownership, lower institutional and lower block ownership (5%) have higher information disclosure.

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Agency problems and performance of Korean companies during the Asian financial crisis: Chaebol vs. non-chaebol firms

Cited by 68 publications

References 42 publications

Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea

Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea

Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Impact of Corporate Governance on Social and Environmental Information Disclosure of Malaysian Listed Banks: Panel Data Analysis

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