Agency ‘in itself’. A discussion of inanimate, animal and human agency

Abstract

Agency', the concept, its connections to ontology and its uses within archaeological theory, are discussed and criticized. In recent archaeological theory, the term 'agency' has been attributed to things, plants, animals and humans. In this paper it is argued that the term 'agency' is logically meaningless if applied to everything that moves or has effects on its surroundings, and that we need a new, more precise terminology that discriminates between 'agency', 'effect', 'actant' and 'effectant'. That people, of all cultures, perceive and experience things/objects as having agency is explained as being due to projections of human characteristics, human psycho-neurological functioning, and the fact that all individuals and cultures are deeply involved with and dependent on things/objects. Connected to this, questions regarding different ontologies, animism, ethics and sciences are discussed. The paper presents a critique of symmetrical archaeology and materiality studies. Broader paradigmatic perspectives, more theoretical and methodological inclusiveness, and more interand trans-disciplinary endeavours are suggested to increase archaeology's 'agency'.

Lyrics for a duskier Enlightenment. In response to Alexandra Ion

“…To follow directly up on that, and to be frank, this dialogue may easily take the form of trench warfare because, and I would like to emphasize this, Ion and I, as well as the clans that we both summon in the acknowledgements to our respective articles, disagree on issues central to this discussion. This has been made clear also in several recent publications and open debates (Lindstrøm 2015; Olsen and Witmore 2015; Ribeiro 2016a, 2016b; Sørensen 2016a; 2018). What is evident in those writings, moreover, is that this disagreement is rather fundamental.…”

Hammers and nails. A response to Lindstrøm and to Olsen and Witmore

“…Let me begin by addressing a pivotal opening claim by Lindstrøm (2015, 207): everything looks like a nail if you're holding a hammer. For a number of archaeologists, Lindstrøm contends, ‘agency’ has become the hammer, because they believe that everything ( every thing , literally) is acting as an agent, regardless of the ‘true’ nature of things.…”

“…Then, rather than seeing agency through its a priori definition, hinging on intentionality, object agency should be studied for its de facto effects. Running the risk of ‘reinventing the wheel’ (Lindstrøm 2015, 213), I suggest that it may be worthwhile to differentiate between agency as present-at-hand and agency as ready-to-hand . In the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1962, §15), present-at-hand implies an objective concern with a phenomenon: the neutral, factual observation of an artefact.…”

“…This leads me to a final point of criticism in Lindstrøm, as I believe she illustrates the absolute necessity for cultural analyses to pursue an emic perspective on ontology, complementing – sometimes contrasting – Western notions of being and reality. This is not out of respect for the Other, as Lindstrøm claims (2015, 222), but out of sheer academic necessity: if we want to understand the Other, it would be misguided to start out by assuming that her or his perception of the world is wrong, just because it does not match our ontological categories and scientific logics. The imperative for grasping difference in cultural analyses (e.g.…”

“…The question is, then, whether the aim of a cultural analysis is to highlight the transubstantiation as delusion and deception, or to try to unravel what this practice means for our understanding of materiality, senses, divinity, presence, worship and so on. The real presence of Christ can probably be explained through some neurological ‘wiring’ in the brain (Lindstrøm 2015, 215), but this does not make Christ less present for the worshipper, and I would be far more interested in trying to understand the perceived reality of this magical event than having it explained through the mechanics of natural science.…”