2017
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12583
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Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover

Abstract: We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a comparative advantage to lead the firm through a new growth phase. We show how the optimal contract can be implemented with a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses, along with dismissal and severance policie… Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 58 publications
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“…Scholars have also examined CEO tenure and its relationship to the horizon problem-a CEO's lower motivation and incentives to act in the interest of the organization as the time for departure from the position grows near. Scholars have examined if CEOs engage in earnings manipulation-self-interested changes in accounting and investment choices in their final years of tenure-aimed at increasing the individual benefits that materialize within or after their incumbency (Adut et al, 2003;Anderson et al, 2018;Brickley et al, 1999;Heyden et al, 2017;Iliev & Vitanova, 2019;Page, 2018;Sampson & Shi, 2020;Wowak et al, 2011;Zhang, 2008). Scholars argue that as CEO tenure advances, CEOs enjoy the discretion needed to allocate resources and influence a firm's accounting in a way that serves their interests.…”
Section: The Horizon Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Scholars have also examined CEO tenure and its relationship to the horizon problem-a CEO's lower motivation and incentives to act in the interest of the organization as the time for departure from the position grows near. Scholars have examined if CEOs engage in earnings manipulation-self-interested changes in accounting and investment choices in their final years of tenure-aimed at increasing the individual benefits that materialize within or after their incumbency (Adut et al, 2003;Anderson et al, 2018;Brickley et al, 1999;Heyden et al, 2017;Iliev & Vitanova, 2019;Page, 2018;Sampson & Shi, 2020;Wowak et al, 2011;Zhang, 2008). Scholars argue that as CEO tenure advances, CEOs enjoy the discretion needed to allocate resources and influence a firm's accounting in a way that serves their interests.…”
Section: The Horizon Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They clear the situation by using the data from the year 1995 of the USA's three key industries. Their study indicated that when a firm is going through severe distress, payment of the dividend is restricted by the creditors, thus it becomes useless to utilize the policy of dividend to increase firm growth (Anderson et al, 2017;al Ahbabi & Nobanee, 2019).…”
Section: Journal Of Entrepreneurship Management and Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(5) Can the government influence the discount rate and the long-term production efficiency to adopt the VC's optimal exit choice as the overall optimal exit decision? For parameter selection, we refer to Sannikov [28], DeMarzo and Sannikov [33], Anderson et al [34], and Williams [35].…”
Section: Numerical Experimental Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%