Agency Fever? Analysis of an International Policy Fashion

Transparency in practice: Evidence from ‘verification analyses’ issued by the Polish Agency for Health Technology Assessment in 2012–2015

“…It is for this reason that the AHTAPol’s limited reporting of the authors, experts and contributors to its VAs is concerning, and that the practice of collating expert opinion in NICE’s ERG reports deserves rethinking. The Polish case calls for particular caution as the gaps in reporting expert opinions and conflicts of interest may be part of a broader set of challenges associated with widespread relationships between senior clinicians advising the AHTAPol and the pharmaceutical industry (Ozierański et al ., 2012a; Ozierański and King, 2017). The absence of information on contributions from, and potential conflicts of interests of, AHTAPol employees involved in developing VAs is especially puzzling given the well-documented revolving door syndrome between the ATHAPol and the commercial sector, including both consultancies and drug companies (Ozierański and King, 2016).…”

“…In the first case, transparency of HTA bodies, the very operation of the appraisal body, the Transparency Council (TC), has been a major improvement in the area of transparency (Kolasa et al ., 2011b). Nevertheless, the AHTAPol has faced challenges in ensuring the transparency of its relationships with key stakeholders in the drug evaluation process, especially policymakers (Nizankowski and Wilk, 2009) and drug manufacturers (Kolasa et al ., 2011b; Ozierański et al ., 2012a, 2012b, Ozierański and King, 2017), although, of course, these problems are not unique to Poland. Similar findings have been reported in other EU countries, especially in CEE (Franken et al ., 2012; Gulácsi et al ., 2014).…”

Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia

“…They, furthermore, advocated the establishment of various small and autonomous agencies for performance improvements (Pollitt et al . 2001). The disillusionment with these approaches and the dismal record of structural adjustment programs led contemporary scholarship to a much more nuanced perspective, and even the multilateral institutions are now aware of the need for capable administrations (e.g.…”

Corporate governance and democratic accountability: local state-owned enterprises in Norway

“…A prominent feature of public management reform during the last decades has been the devolution of tasks and services to semi-autonomous entities (Christensen and Laegreid 2001;Pollitt et al 2001;Pollitt and Talbot 2004;Verhoest et al 2012). Moving public services "further out" from political control (Pollitt 2004) actualises a potential trade-off between control and autonomy (Christensen and Laegreid 2006;Bovens et al 2008) and raises concerns over accountability deficitsa deficiency of political control by elected representatives (Mulgan 2014).…”

“…Moving public services "further out" from political control (Pollitt 2004) actualises a potential trade-off between control and autonomy (Christensen and Laegreid 2006;Bovens et al 2008) and raises concerns over accountability deficitsa deficiency of political control by elected representatives (Mulgan 2014). A substantial body of literature has explored accountability issues related to statutory bodies, which are agencies with high degrees of autonomy but clear linkages to a parent ministry (Pollitt et al 2001;Verhoest et al 2010). However, these agencies constitute the penultimate case of devolution at best.…”