2003
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.420763
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Agency Conflicts, Expropriation and Firm Value: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China

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Cited by 3 publications
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“…Some authors, however, suggest that the distinction between state ownership and legal-person ownership can be consequential(Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2003;Sun and Tong, 2003). They find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm performance after SIP (share issuing privatization), which suggests that legal persons behave differently from the state government.The listed companies in the A share markets provide on average 35% of the total shares for the public in the open bid and these shares are circulated in the secondary market after IPOs.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some authors, however, suggest that the distinction between state ownership and legal-person ownership can be consequential(Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2003;Sun and Tong, 2003). They find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm performance after SIP (share issuing privatization), which suggests that legal persons behave differently from the state government.The listed companies in the A share markets provide on average 35% of the total shares for the public in the open bid and these shares are circulated in the secondary market after IPOs.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%