2015
DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2015.38
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Agency and Incentives: Vertical Integration in the Mortgage Foreclosure Industry

Abstract: In many U.S. states, the law firms that represent lenders in foreclosure proceedings must hire auctioneers to carry out the foreclosure auctions. We empirically test whether processing times differ for law firms that integrate the mortgage foreclosure auction process compared with law firms that contract with independent auction companies. We find that independent firms are able to initially schedule auctions more quickly, but when postponements occur, they are no faster to adapt. Since firms schedule the init… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…PRTF has fared worse in studies that examine how asset ownership affects NCAs. Contra PRTF, Lambie‐Hanson and Lambie‐Hanson (2017) find that independent auction companies do not reschedule foreclosure auctions faster than auction companies that are part of law firms, even though the former have stronger incentives to do so. Likewise, Knott (2001) reports that quick‐printing establishments that broke away from a franchise chain engaged in fewer marketing‐related NCAs, despite independent establishments having a greater degree of residual control rights that should positively affect NCAs.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PRTF has fared worse in studies that examine how asset ownership affects NCAs. Contra PRTF, Lambie‐Hanson and Lambie‐Hanson (2017) find that independent auction companies do not reschedule foreclosure auctions faster than auction companies that are part of law firms, even though the former have stronger incentives to do so. Likewise, Knott (2001) reports that quick‐printing establishments that broke away from a franchise chain engaged in fewer marketing‐related NCAs, despite independent establishments having a greater degree of residual control rights that should positively affect NCAs.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, external evidence suggests that forbearance was mostly used by borrowers experiencing negative income or expenditure shocks. Lambie-Hanson et al (2021) present survey data that at least three-quarters of borrowers entering forbearance had experienced a job disruption or income loss. Zhao et al (2020) document using rich administrative data that borrowers in forbearance had experienced larger income declines, and were more likely to have lost their jobs or to have have received unemployment benefits.…”
Section: Summary and Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 77%