Against the Maximality Principle

Abstract

To hold that only one conscious thing is sitting in your chair, philosophers have appealed to maximality: If a property M is maximal, then anything that has property M does not have large proper parts that have property M. Philosophers have said that ordinary objects are maximal, including houses, cats, rocks, and have argued by analogy that consciousness is maximal. I argue that the maximality principle mistakenly excludes some members of a kind. Thus, it is not the correct principle to explain why, for example, you are conscious but the proper part that is all-of-you-but-yourarm is not conscious.

Johnston versus Johnston

“…Johnston credits Mark Hinchliff with bringing the problem to his attention.24 SeeJohnston (2017: p. 625). See also similar examples inSutton (2014).…”

Criteria of identity without sortals

“…Importantly, the sortalweighted change-minimizing criterion has the resources to handle these cases as well. Sutton (2014) describes cases where, for some sortal property, F, an F has a large proper part that is also an F, and F is a plausible candidate for a substance sortal property. Imagine a tile that is composed of other tiles.…”

Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

“…Against the maximality proposal, Sutton (2014) and Madden (2016a) show that there are cases in which large proper parts of an F qualify as Fs. In response to this type of objection: (1) one might offer and defend a maximality proposal that places restrictions (other than size) on the sort of thing that can be a part of an F while still being an F. For example, one might propose that for a proper part of an F to be an F its F‐activity must be independent in the right sort of way of the F‐activity of the whole, and then the task would be to explain what sort of independent F‐activity would allow the part to be an F. Now, if the animal is a person, then assuming that the person‐activity of the brain, the head, the top‐half,… is not independent in the manner described of the person‐activity of the animal, those parts will not themselves count as persons.…”

“…Also, the idea that personhood is maximal allows that the persons in D* and CP* are proper parts of animals, given that the animal of which they are parts is not itself a person. Against the maximality proposal, Sutton (2014) and Madden (2016a) show that there are cases in which large proper parts of an F qualify as Fs. In response to this type of objection:…”