Against Smallism And Localism

Abstract

Abstract. The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of "smallism" and "localism". We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.

Constitution Embodiment

“…21 Only a psychological conception of affect is also a biological phenomenon that is locatable in the "inner body" (Colombetti & 19 We encounter a similar mistake in the literature quite often. On the one hand, "localism" (de Oliveira & Chemero, 2015) or the "the spatial containment language of internal/external or inside/outside" (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009, p. 26) are correctly criticized. But then on the other hand, Oliveira and Chemero argue for extended cognition based on empirical evidence, and Thompson and Stapleton provide an account of the embodied mind as a neurological system that is continuously coupled to its environment; i.e., they defend claims about the extendedness of what they identify with the physical realization basis of the embodied mind.…”