Against Putin and Corruption, for Navalny and the “Revolution”?

Abstract

This article seeks to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of the nationwide protests that appeared in Russia as a result of the large-scale political campaigns of 2017–18. On the basis of an original database devoted to six protests, organized in this period by different anti-systemic opposition leaders and organizations, the study explores the turnout and geographic scope of these events and the repertoire of frames that were used to mobilize the protesters. The analysis contrasts three types of frames (an anti-corruption protest frame, election campaign event frame, and anti-systemic protest frame) and demonstrates that appropriate framing was a necessary condition of successful protest mobilization. In combination with other factors, such as the quality of protest organization and the impact of repressive actions of the authorities, the changes of protest frames contributed to the protests’ turnout dynamics. Alexei Navalny, the most popular anti-systemic leader, succeeded in organizing the initial mobilization by framing it as an anti-corruption protest, but then, under increasing repression, the opposition failed to convert this dissent into a longer-term campaign with broader electoral or anti-systemic frames.

The Impact of Social Network Sites on Youth Political Engagement in Russia

“…As will be discussed below, the success of Navalny's protests in 2017 can largely be attributed to his ability to apply a suitable interpretive frame to the cause (Fomin and Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk 2022). The frames used by Navalny were successful in attracting a large number of participants due to the high capacity for those frames to be relatable.…”

“…As I will argue below, because SNS are designed for their users to employ them in their identity negotiation, these sites became an irreplaceable instrument for Navalny's mobilization strategies. Less relatable themes did not attract as many participants (instead, they mostly attracted his core supporters) and based on polling data, Navalny himself was far from the primary motivator for anti-regime alternative political engagement among youth and protest participants in general (A. S. Arkhipova, Zakharov, and Kozlova 2021;Fomin and Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk 2022).…”

“…To maintain their influential position in the network, network authorities must have a keen sense of how to frame important political events in such a manner that is agreeable with as many network participants as possible. Indeed, as will be discussed below, having a successful interpretive frame is what can make all the difference in SNSenabled protest mobilization (Fomin and Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk 2022).…”

“…The success of Navalny's demonstrations in 2017 hinged almost entirely on his ability to create fitting and successful interpretive frames (Fomin and Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk 2022). The slogans and memes that were generated by Navalny and his team-and, subsequently, in a more spontaneous fashion, by the online opposition community in which Navalny and his allies are among the network authorities-acted as a conduit of these interpretive frames and are in no small part a reason for the success of the 2017-2021 protests.…”

“…The 2017 anti-corruption protests were sparked by Navalny's documentary film "He is not Dimon to you," an exposé that details an elaborate corruption scheme involving the then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Lonkila, Shpakovskaya, and Torchinsky 2021;Fomin and Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk 2022;Moroz 2020;Wijermars 2021). Much of the evidence presented in the documentary was discovered online through email leaks, a meticulous sifting through the publicly available procurement system GosZakupki, and Medvedev's own social media publications (Wijermars 2021).…”