Against Privatisation As Such

Dorfman, Avihay; Harel, Alon

doi:10.1093/ojls/gqv029

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…As shown by Anderson, goods can be privately owned without being allocated by the market, or publicly owned and marketised (Anderson, 1993: 190-191). There might be other reasons to think that legal justice should be a product of a completely public owned endeavour, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper (for more on this see Brennan, 2017;Dorfman and Harel, 2016). 10.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market

Agmon

2020

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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The adversarial legal system is traditionally praised for its normative appeal: it protects individual rights; ensures an equal, impartial, and consistent application of the law; and, most importantly, its competitive structure facilitates the discovery of truth – both in terms of the facts, and in terms of the correct interpretation of the law. At the same time, legal representation is allocated as a commodity, bought and sold in the market: the more one pays, the better legal representation one gets. In this article, I argue that the integration of a market in legal representation with the adversarial system undercuts the very normative justifications on which the system is based. Furthermore, I argue that there are two implicit conditions, which are currently unmet, but are required for the standard justifications to hold: that there is (equal opportunity for) equality of legal representation between parties, and that each party has (equal opportunity for) a sufficient level of legal representation. I, therefore, outline an ideal proposal for reform that would satisfy these conditions.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market

Agmon

2020

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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“…Much of the existing analysis still rests on a binary distinction between private and public welfare (e.g. Dorfman and Harel, 2013). Walker (1984) concedes that his own analysis is 'based on a comparison between the two extremes of the formal services continuum' (Walker, 1984: 34).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Security Privatisation in the UK: a means to whose end?

Edmiston¹

2014

PPP

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This paper investigates how privatisation trends have affected the right to social security in the UK since 1979. Privatisation has regularly been posited as a solution to more efficiently and effectively target public services. However, the procedural effects of social security privatisation have been the opposite, with increased social spending accompanied by poorly targeted provision. Those able to wield democratic influence and consumer interests over legislative entitlement have disproportionately benefited from increased social security efforts. This paper illustrates that a confluence of factors affect the right to social security within and beyond substantive privatisation processes. Whilst the, albeit gradual, diversification of social security has proven critical, the principles underpinning such developments have proven far more significant in informing and threatening the right to social security for those who most need it.

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“…12 The literature on public management reform more generally is of course important, both theoretically (for example, in relation to the ‘health and vitality of democratic governance’, Dorfman and Harel, 2016; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) and empirically (see De Vries & Nemec, 2013 for a recent review). Few studies manage to combine moral or theoretical argument with dispassionate empirical evaluation (so, for example, does privatisation ‘reduce political engagement’, as claimed by Dorfman and Harel?)…”

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confidence: 99%

Privatising public prisons: Penality, law and practice

Liebling

Ludlow

2016

Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology

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In October 2011, HM Prison Birmingham was transferred from public to private management, under G4S. This was the first time that an existing operational public prison was privatised in the UK. The move marked the third and most far reaching phase of prison privatisation policy, and was intended both to increase quality of life for prisoners, from a low baseline, and to reduce costs. Prior to 2011, private prisons had all been new-builds. Private contractors had thus far avoided the additional challenges of inheriting a pre-existing workforce and operating in old, often unsuitable, buildings. This article reports on a longitudinal evaluation of the complex process of the transition, and some outcomes for both staff and prisoners. As an experiment in the reorganisation of work and life in a 'traditional' public sector prison, the exercise was unprecedented, has set the agenda for future transformations. The example illustrates the intense, distinctive and rapidly changing nature of penality as it makes itself felt in the lived prison experience, and raises important questions about the changing use of State power.

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Against Privatisation As Such

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market

Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market

Social Security Privatisation in the UK: a means to whose end?

Privatising public prisons: Penality, law and practice

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