Against modernist illusions: why we need more democratic and constructivist alternatives to debunking conspiracy theories

Abstract

Various societal and academic actors argue that conspiracy theories should be debunked by insisting on the truthfulness of real "facts" provided by established epistemic institutions. But are academic scholars the appropriate actors to correct people's beliefs and is that the right and most productive thing to do? Drawing on years of ethnographic research experiences in the Dutch conspiracy milieu, I explain in this paper why debunking conspiracy theories is not possible (can scholars actually know the real truth?), not professional (is taking sides in truth wars what we should do?), and not productive (providing more "correct" information won't work as knowledge acceptance is not just a cognitive/epistemic issue). Instead of reinstalling the modernist legitimation narrative of science, I argue in this paper for an alternative that is both epistemologically stronger and sociologically more effective. Building from research and experiments with epistemic democracy in the field of science and technology studies, I propose to have "deliberative citizen knowledge platforms", instead of elite experts groups alone, asses the quality of public information. Such societally representative bodies should enjoy more legitimacy and epistemic diversity to better deal with conspiracy theories and the broader societal conflicts over truth and knowledge they represent.

Uncertain Knowledge. Studying “Truth” and “Conspiracies” in the Digital Age

“…The production of scientific claims, as well as their reception by certain critical or "skeptical" audiences, have long been central issues in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Although they have rarely addressed the issue of "conspiracy theories" (see Baskin, 2019;Harambam, 2020bHarambam, , 2021Prasad, 2021 for a few exceptions), these studies focus instead on the social fabrication of truth. They have, for example, studied the modes of production of objectivity in the scientific field (Daston & Galison, 2007) and the power relations at work in the production of knowledge and forms of ignorance (Gross & McGoey, 2015).…”

Poly-truth, or the limits of pluralism: Popular debates on conspiracy theories in a post-truth era

“…In such analyses, rather clear-cut distinctions are made between the esteemed objective realm of facts, science, and reason and the “dangerous” subjective realm of emotions, ideology, and irrationality. As such, they reinstate the modernist legitimation narrative of science ( Harambam, 2021 ) and profess the classical “politics of demarcation” ( Marres, 2018 ).…”

“…The dominant diagnostic response to post-truth issues is the reinstalment of the modernist legitimation narrative of science ( Harambam, 2021 ): conspiracy theories (and other forms of “inferior” information) should be debunked (fact-checked) and/or banned from the public sphere (content moderation), while people should listen to legacy media and scientific experts again ( Drążkiewicz and Harambam, 2021 ; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017 ). While some Science and Technology Studies scholars have rightfully pointed to the confluence of values, politics, and facts in scientific and public knowledge ( Fuller, 2018 ; Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017 ; Marres, 2018 ), most post-truth discourse presents clear-cut distinctions between the esteemed objective realm of facts, science, and reason and the dangerous subjective realm of emotions, ideology, and irrationality.…”

Savoirs incertains

“…La construction des énoncés scientifiques, ainsi que leur réception par certains publics contestataires ou « sceptiques », sont depuis longtemps des problématiques centrales des recherches conduites dans le champ des Science & Technology Studies (STS). S'ils ont rarement abordé la question des théories du complot, à quelques exceptions près (Baskin, 2019;Harambam, 2020bHarambam, , 2021Prasad, 2021), ces travaux traitent en revanche frontalement de la fabrique sociale de la vérité. Ils étudient par exemple les modes de production de l'objectivité dans le champ scientifique (Daston & Galison, 2007), et les rapports de force à l'oeuvre dans la production de connaissances et de formes d'ignorance (Gross & McGoey, 2015).…”