Against Design

Devins, Caryn; Koppl, Roger; Kauffman, Stuart; Felin, Teppo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2570030

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…To what extent does this indict institutional design sui generis? Must we be “against design” (Devins et al , 2015)? More specifically, what underlying factors render a given instantiation of procedural liberalism durable?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

Salter

Furton

2018

JEPP

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to integrate classical elite theory into theories of constitutional bargains. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative methods/surveys/case studies. Findings Open-ended constitutional entrepreneurship cannot be forestalled. Constitutional entrepreneurs will almost always be social elites. Research limitations/implications The research yields a toolkit for analysing constitutional bargains. It needs to be used in historical settings to acquire greater empirical content. Need to be applied to concrete historical cases to do economic history. Right now it is still only institutionally contingent theory. Practical implications Formal constitutions do not, and cannot, bind. Informal constitutions can, but they are continually evolving due to elite pressure group behaviors. Social implications Liberalism needs another method to institutionalize itself! Originality/value Open-ended nature of constitutional bargaining overlooked in orthodox institutional entrepreneurship/constitutional economics literature.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

Salter

Furton

2018

JEPP

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“…For example, in Devins et al . (2015) we argue ‘against design’ and highlight how institutions such as the US Constitution have been utilized in surprising and unintended ways, both for positive and negative ends. Institutions, then, can readily provide unanticipated opportunities for arbitrage by entrepreneurial actors.…”

Section: The Affordances Of Institutions and Arbitragementioning

confidence: 94%

A forum on minds and institutions

Felin

2015

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The purpose of this special topic forum is to call for research on the topic of minds and institutions. I briefly discuss three specific research opportunities: (1) bounded rationality versus mind, (2) many minds and the interfaces of institutions, (3) the affordances of institutions and arbitrage. I then briefly introduce the two special topic forum papers and highlight how they link to the topic of minds and institutions.

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“…"Substantial meal" is a serviceable concept adapted to context. Using it as a general rule was sure to fail because any imposed rule becomes "a tool that unknown persons will use in unknowable ways for unknowable ends" (Devins et al, 2015). The term becomes a façade, a Potemkin village that hides purposes, choices, strategies, habits, and practices that cannot be known or imagined by the rule makers.…”

Section: The Nature Of Dispersed Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Public health and expert failure

Koppl

2021

Public Choice

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In a modern democracy, a public health system includes mechanisms for the provision of expert scientific advice to elected officials. The decisions of elected officials generally will be degraded by expert failure, that is, the provision of bad advice. The theory of expert failure suggests that competition among experts generally is the best safeguard against expert failure. Monopoly power of experts increases the chance of expert failure. The risk of expert failure also is greater when scientific advice is provided by only one or a few disciplines. A national government can simulate a competitive market for expert advice by structuring the scientific advice it receives to ensure the production of multiple perspectives from multiple disciplines. I apply these general principles to the United Kingdom's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).

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Against Design

Cited by 11 publications

References 14 publications

Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

A forum on minds and institutions

Public health and expert failure

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