Against Credibility

Shieber, Joseph

doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.560953

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…1995, 2004) hold that one is justified in accepting the testimony of a speaker only if one’s acceptance is grounded (at least partially) in monitoring (though not necessarily reflectively or consciously) for cues diagnostic of the trustworthiness of the speaker. Drawing on social psychological research in deception detection, Shieber (2012) and Michaelian (2010) argue that, though we do typically monitor for deception, we aren’t particularly reliable in determining speaker sincerity. 23 If we aren’t reliable at detecting mendacity, then monitoring for deception shouldn’t be required for the justified acceptance of testimony, pace E. Fricker.…”

Section: Prescriptive Credibility Deficits and Credibility Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

Munroe

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

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In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of (1) the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and (2) how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments.

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Section: Prescriptive Credibility Deficits and Credibility Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

Munroe

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…4, this means that, like any theory of testimony that maintains a monitoring requirement, it ought to reject the Liberal View. 21 For criticisms of monitoring requirements, see Shieber (2012).…”

Section: Children's Consumption Of Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The sorts of resources available to the hearer are discussed inKenyon (2013) andFricker (1994).27 AsShieber (2012) argues, the literature in social psychology suggests both that there may be no uniform signs of untrustworthiness and that, if there are, subjects are not good at picking up on them.…”

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confidence: 99%

Linguistic Understanding and Testimonial Warrant

Pollock

2021

Erkenn

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How much linguistic understanding is required for testimonial knowledge acquisition? One answer is that, so long as we grasp the content expressed by the speaker, it does not matter if our understanding of it is poor. Call this the 'Liberal View' of testimony. This approach looks especially promising when combined with the thesis that we share a public language that makes it easy to grasp the right content. In this paper, I argue that this picture is epistemically problematic. Poor linguistic understanding undermines our ability to recognise evidence and counterevidence for the testimonial content. Because of this, in many cases in which a hearer's understanding is poor, her resultant testimonial belief will lack sufficient warrant to qualify as knowledge. Given that we often do not possess a sufficiently good understanding of the testimony we consume, I argue that we acquire far less knowledge through testimony than the Liberal View suggests.

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“…Let's consider the case of face‐to‐face testimony first. There are good reasons to question whether any account of knowledge acquisition through face‐to‐face testimony can include a condition involving a reliable epistemic competence for the formation of credibility judgments (Shieber, ; Shieber, ).…”

Section: First Piece Of Evidence For the Fundamental Problem: Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

Shieber

2019

Philosophical Issues

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Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher-order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence.Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that are instantiated in human cognition. Philosophical Issues. 2019;29:241-253.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phis

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Against Credibility

Cited by 20 publications

References 53 publications

Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

Linguistic Understanding and Testimonial Warrant

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

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