Afterpulse Analysis for Quantum Key Distribution

Fan-Yuan, Guan-Jie; Wang, Chao; Wang, Shuang; Yin, Zhen-Qiang; He, Liu; Chen, Wei; He, De‐Yong; Han, Zheng‐Fu; Guo, Guang‐Can

doi:10.1103/physrevapplied.10.064032

Cited by 36 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The problem to obtain the photon‐number distributions in Equations ()–() is to calculate the

p_{a p}^{s r c}

. According to the Reference 30, the afterpulse probability depends on two parameters, the response probability of light pulse and dark count,

Q_{d}^{s r c}

, and the afterpulse rate,

p_{a}^{s r c}

, of the detector.

\begin{align} p_{a p}^{s r c} = \frac{p_{a}^{s r c}}{1 prefix- p_{a}^{s r c}} Q_{d}^{s r c}, \end{align}

where

p_{a}^{s r c}

is the intrinsic character of the detector and can be measured as shown in Reference 33.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In passive decoy modes, the probability distribution of photon number depends on the response probability of the detector, normally using the single-photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) due to its high quantum efficiency, low price, and great robustness. [27][28][29] For SPADs, all light pulses, dark counts and afterpulses can report response signals, 30 where the afterpulse probability can be increased with a high repetition rate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 Besides, for the detectors of receivers, the absence of the afterpulse effect reduces the accuracy of simulated gains and quantum bit error rates (QBERs), which leads to ill-fitting optimized parameters, causing a loss of secure key rate. 30 In this article, we develop an analytical model for the passive decoy method to realize the afterpulse compatibility as is shown in Section 2. The afterpulse effects of both the source side and receiver side are fully considered with a complete finite-size analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One is the omission of afterpulses in the source side leads to a deviation of photon‐number distributions from reality, thus damages the reliability of the estimated yield and error yield of single photon which determine the security of generated keys 4 . Besides, for the detectors of receivers, the absence of the afterpulse effect reduces the accuracy of simulated gains and quantum bit error rates (QBERs), which leads to ill‐fitting optimized parameters, causing a loss of secure key rate 30 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Afterpulse analysis for passive decoy quantum key distribution

Fan-Yuan

Wang

Yin

et al. 2020

Quantum Engineering

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The passive decoy method, a candidate for high-speed quantum key distribution (QKD), can prepare laser pulses with various photon-number distributions according to the responses of the transmitter's detectors, which usually adopts the single-photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) in QKD. As an intrinsic characteristic of the SPAD, the afterpulse can introduce random detector responses, however, is regrettably ignored in passive schemes. Here we develop an analytical model for passive schemes in the finite-resource regime to describe the afterpulse effect on the detectors of both transmitter and receiver. The photon-number distributions biased by afterpulses are corrected, which reveals that the secure key rate is significantly overrated when the afterpulse is ignored. Moreover, our model can increase the tolerance of passive decoy source to afterpulse effect as the result shows that the secret key rates are comparable at different afterpulse probability by reoptimization.

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“…The problem to obtain the photon‐number distributions in Equations ()–() is to calculate the

p_{a p}^{s r c}

. According to the Reference 30, the afterpulse probability depends on two parameters, the response probability of light pulse and dark count,

Q_{d}^{s r c}

, and the afterpulse rate,

p_{a}^{s r c}

, of the detector.

\begin{align} p_{a p}^{s r c} = \frac{p_{a}^{s r c}}{1 prefix- p_{a}^{s r c}} Q_{d}^{s r c}, \end{align}

where

p_{a}^{s r c}

is the intrinsic character of the detector and can be measured as shown in Reference 33.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Afterpulse analysis for passive decoy quantum key distribution

Fan-Yuan

Wang

Yin

et al. 2020

Quantum Engineering

Self Cite

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show abstract

“…We implement the standard BB84 protocol with decoy states in our system [1], [35], [36]. The secure key rate is lower bounded by [35], [36]…”

Section: Appendix B Secure Key Rate and Qbermentioning

confidence: 99%

A Quantum Access Network Suitable for Internetworking Optical Network Units

et al. 2019

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Quantum access networks allow a large number of users to access quantum networks, which can be regarded as an important part of the practical application for quantum communication. However, current quantum access networks have not considered as the peer-to-peer multimedia service between optical network units (ONUs) that have become the dominant service in the access networks. Thus, we propose a quantum access network that can support direct quantum and classical ONU-ONU communication by using an N:N splitter. In addition, we improve the efficiency of quantum key distribution (QKD) from both the physical and the data link layer. For the former, we analyze spontaneous Raman scattering (SRS) that is the main impairment source to QKD due to the co-propagation of the classical and quantum signal. Then, we propose a collision-avoiding scheme to reduce the influence of the SRS. For the latter, a dynamic time slot assignment protocol is proposed to reduce discarding secure keys greatly. The two methods are verified by simulations, and the results show that each method can effectively optimize QKD performance. INDEX TERMS Quantum key distribution, quantum access network, direct ONU-ONU communication, spontaneous Raman scattering.

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Optimizing Decoy‐State Protocols for Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Fan-Yuan

Wang

et al. 2021

Adv Quantum Tech

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The decoy-state protocol enables quantum key distribution (QKD) systems to achieve high performance without using the single-photon source. In the dozen years since the decoy-state protocol has been proposed, a series of advances in scheme design, finite-size analysis, system modelling, and parameter estimation has developed. Unfortunately, most advances are based on different starting points and lack a synthesis to figure out the optimal protocol of decoy-state method. Here, the advances in decoy-state method are reviewed and they are synthesized to compare the key-rate performance of 38 decoy-state protocols using the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm. To form a guideline for practical QKD systems, the optimal decoy-state protocols are found with the change of five system parameters (the transmission loss, the block size of postprocessing, the misalignment-error probability, the dark-count probability, and the afterpulse rate). It is expected that this work can answer the questions of what the actual performance is for different decoy-state protocol in various scenarios and which decoy-state protocol is the optimal choice for various QKD systems.

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Afterpulse Analysis for Quantum Key Distribution

Cited by 36 publications

References 32 publications

Afterpulse analysis for passive decoy quantum key distribution

Afterpulse analysis for passive decoy quantum key distribution

A Quantum Access Network Suitable for Internetworking Optical Network Units

Optimizing Decoy‐State Protocols for Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems

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