After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the European Union

Abstract

The role of national parliaments in EU matters has become an important subject in the debate over the democratic legitimacy of European Union (EU) decision-making. Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights both at the domestic and at the European level is often seen as an effective measure to address the perceived 'democratic deficit' of the EUthe reason for affording them a prominent place in the newly introduced 'Provisions on Democratic Principles' of the Union (in particular Art.12 TEU). Whether this aim can be met, however, depends crucially on the degree and the manner in which national parliaments actually make use of their institutional rights. This volume therefore aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the activities of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon era. This includes the 'classic' scrutiny of EU legislation, but also parliamentary involvement in EU foreign policy, the use of new parliamentary participations rights of the Lisbon Treaty (Early Warning System), their role regarding the EU's response to the eurozone crisis and the, so far under-researched, role of parliamentary administrators in scrutiny processes. In this introduction, we provide the guiding theoretical framework for the contributions. Based on neo-institutionalist approaches, we discuss institutional capacities and political motivation as the two key explanatory factors in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs.Keywords: National Parliaments, EU, Scrutiny, Lisbon Treaty, Neo-Institutionalism, democratic legitimacy 'Maybe not formally speaking, but at least politically speaking, all national parliaments have become, in a way, European institutions' (Van Rompuy 2012). Whether it is indeed true -or 2 even desirable -that national parliaments have become 'European institutions' in a more narrow sense, is open to debate (Cygan 2013: 21). Yet the statement certainly suggests that the former 'losers' of the European integration process have come a long way. For a long time the role of national parliaments was not formally recognised at the European level, and in the domestic arena the integration process provided ample opportunities for the executive actors to bypass legislatures and strengthen their hold on policy-making. Concerns about a growing democratic deficit were addressed through repeated and substantial expansions of the powers of the European Parliament, whereas national parliaments remained on the margins.However, over time the 'victims' of integration have learned 'to fight back' and obtained new opportunities for participation in domestic European policy-making. It was a slow and uneven process through which in they improved their institutional position, but they gained increased rights to scrutinise European affairs and to control the way in which ministers and officials represented national interests in Brussels. Today, the Lisbon Treaty not only mentions the role of national parliaments explicitly (article 12 TEU), but it also gives them a role within the EU's legis...

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

“…Parliaments associated with single-party governments will be less interested in getting involved in the ES than parliaments associated with coalition governments as the government-opposition dynamics is less likely to make a dent in the former than in the latter case (Auel & Benz, 2005;Wonka & G€ obel, 2016). Katrin Auel and her colleagues also underline that it is not just the institutional prerogatives of parliaments that explain their degree of ownership of the Semester (as originally hypothesized by Auel, 2007), but motivational factors as well (Auel & Christiansen, 2015;Auel & H€ oing, 2015;Auel, Rozenberg & Tacea, 2015). Kreilinger (2016) analyses national parliaments' scrutiny over their executives particularly before national governments submit the SCPs and the NRPs to the Commission and before the Council adopts CSRs (ex ante scrutiny) and after national budgets are adopted (ex post scrutiny).…”

Executive Privilege Reaffirmed? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP

“…In its discussion of sociological institutionalist explanations for the 'motivation' of MPs to participate in EU affairs scrutiny more generally, the Introduction to this volume highlights the importance of parliamentary culture and expectations and norms regarding the appropriate roles for parliamentarians vis-à-vis government (Auel and Christiansen 2015). Applying these concepts to parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP, we can expect MPs to be interested in actively pursuing CFSP scrutiny in parliaments where scrutiny of both EU affairs and foreign policy are perceived as important elements of MPs' work, at least within the relevant committees.…”

“…In essence, this formulation splits the concept of 'capacity', outlined in the Introduction to this volume, into two interlinked parts (formal powers and resource access), with the role of 'attitude' addressing the question of 'motivation' (cf. Auel and Christiansen 2015). Although Born and Hänggi apply this framework specifically to parliamentary scrutiny of the use of military force, it is equally useful for studying how parliamentary scrutiny of all CFSP-related issues is carried out in practice, as it allows for in-depth comparisons between individual parliaments whilst accounting for their very different practices and cultures.…”

“…First, it can present a more realistic empirical picture of parliamentary 'strength' or 'weakness', based both on the capacity of parliaments and on their willingness to use that capacity to control or question their governments (cf. Auel and Christiansen 2015). Assessments of 'strength' as employed here are also reflective, deriving in part from how parliamentarians actually perceive the quality and effectiveness of their own scrutiny efforts.…”

“…Auel and Christiansen 2015). Although formal powers and resources can constrain or empower MPs, having a profound intervening effect on the ultimate quality and scope of scrutiny, whether parliaments choose to make full use of their capacity is largely contingent on the broader normative context in which they operate, which in turn is influenced by parliamentary culture, political salience and party-political fault lines.…”