African and Western Moral Theories in a Bioethical Context

Abstract

The field of bioethics is replete with applications of moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. For a given dilemma, even if it is not clear how one of these western philosophical principles of right (and wrong) action would resolve it, one can identify many of the considerations that each would conclude is relevant. The field is, in contrast, largely unaware of an African account of what all right (and wrong) actions have in common and of the sorts of factors that for it are germane to developing a sound response to a given bioethical problem. My aim is to help rectify this deficiency by first spelling out a moral theory grounded in the mores of many sub-Saharan peoples, and then applying it to some major bioethical issues, namely, the point of medical treatment, free and informed consent, standards of care and animal experimentation. For each of these four issues, I compare and contrast the implications of the African moral theory with utilitarianism and Kantianism, my overall purposes being to highlight respects in which the African moral theory is distinct and to demonstrate that the field should take it at least as seriously as it does the Western theories.

A Critique on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity Concerning Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in South Africa

“…The ultimate goal of a person, self or human in the biological sense should then be to become a "full" person, a "real" self or a "genuine" human being and to exhibit these virtues. Achieving the state of Ubuntu is entirely constitutional by positively relating to others in a certain manner [10]. Personhood or Ubuntu does not begin at conception and it is not inherent.…”

What Is “African Bioethics” as Used by Sub-Saharan African Authors: An Argumentative Literature Review of Articles on African Bioethics

“…This may be correct, but one needs to compare the communalism as thought of by Callahan (Callahan, 2003) to that expressed by the authors reviewed in the article, there are obvious variations. Others have argued that there is a promising territory of theoretical African moral epistemology not yet fully explored, which may contribute to the thought that there is no such African theory, hence the imposition of Western bioethical normative thinking on Africa (Metz, 2010). The issue though is that there should be more written about this to expose the reading world to an otherwise "missed" African worldview of moral/ epistemologic theory, which could inform and contribute to a global bioethics knowledge.…”

A critique of Thad Metz’s African theory of moral status

“…it can conceive of itself in terms of "we" with others, it can coordinate projects with them to achieve some desirable end and it "can care to improve the quality of others' life" (solidarity), i.e. acting motivated by good will or sympathetic considerations for the sake of another's well-being (Metz 2007;2009;2012). And, a being is an object of such relations if it can be included in relations of identity and solidarity by others: this means inter alia that such an entity can be included in relations with human beings and as such can be made worse or better off.…”