Africa, the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court: The Question of Deferrals

Okoth, Juliet R. Amenge

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-029-9_12

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

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“…It is recalled that Article 16 was not intended as a means by which the Security Council could easily undermine the functions of the ICC. 61 The provision is understood by many states as being limited to deferrals of investigations or prosecutions on a case-by-case basis and probably applicable in circumstances where justice conflicts with peaceful negotiation of conflicts. Therefore, African states had relied on Article 16 deferrals as a solution to political conflicts emanating from Africa.…”

Section: Security Council Deferrals and The Allegation Of Bias Againsmentioning

confidence: 99%

African Union and the Politics of Selective Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court

Endoh¹

2020

African Journal of International Criminal Justice

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The African Union (AU) claims that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is selective against African leaders. The issue therefore arises concerning the validity of the allegations of selectivity. Partly because of such concerns, African Heads of States adopted the Malabo Protocol during their annual summit held in June 2014. Article 46A bis of the Protocol provides immunity for sitting Heads of States. This provision contradicts Article 27 of the Rome Statute and, consequently, arguably reverses the progress made so far in international criminal law by giving priority to immunity in the face of impunity. This article considers the validity of some of the allegations of selective application of criminal sanctions by the ICC and the likely consequence of the Malabo Protocol for regional and international criminal justice. The article argues that the Malabo Protocol should not be ratified by African states until the shield of immunity granted to sitting Heads of States is lifted to better advance the interests of justice for the victims of international crimes in Africa. In addition, the complementarity clause stated in the Malabo Protocol should have a nexus with the ICC such that the Court would be allowed to prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes in circumstances where the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) prove reluctant to do so.

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Section: Security Council Deferrals and The Allegation Of Bias Againsmentioning

confidence: 99%

African Union and the Politics of Selective Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court

Endoh¹

2020

African Journal of International Criminal Justice

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The Relationship Between the African States and the International Criminal Court: Immunity or Impunity?

Ingravallo

2018

Peace Maintenance in Africa

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Perspectives on the Intervention of the ICC in Palestine

Adem

2019

Palestine and the International Criminal Court

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Africa, the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court: The Question of Deferrals

Cited by 3 publications

References 5 publications

African Union and the Politics of Selective Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court

African Union and the Politics of Selective Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court

The Relationship Between the African States and the International Criminal Court: Immunity or Impunity?

Perspectives on the Intervention of the ICC in Palestine

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