Africa's Resettlement Strategies

Rogge, John R.

doi:10.1177/0197918381015001-220

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…26. See, for example, Betts, 1984;Rogge, 1980;Gorman, 1993;and Kibreab, 1996and Kibreab, , 1989and Kibreab, , 1983Demusz, 1998;Waters, 1999;and Crisp, 2001). 27.…”

Section: Discussionunclassified

A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development‐induced Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement

Muggah

2003

International Migration

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Development projects and war regularly lead to the internal displacement and involuntary resettlement of tens of millions of people each year. Though most "internally displaced people" settle spontaneously, a significant proportion is involuntarily resettled into planned "camps" and "settlements". This article is primarily concerned with a relatively understudied category of forced migration studies: resettlement. It contends that until very recently, the theory, policy, and practice of resettlement for people internally displaced by development and war have been treated as intellectually and practically exclusive. Decision makers and scholars working on the subject are frequently beholden to narrow disciplinary and bureaucratic interests and are unable or unwilling to look across institutional boundaries. As a result, policies and programmes intended to resettle populations have been clustered into two discrete (and disparate) narratives. Each of these draw from distinct normative moorings, government and nongovernmental interpretations of "success" and "failure" and a division of labour closely tailored to the disciplines and expertise of those in the development and humanitarian communities. Though arising from separate traditions and conceived exclusively by donors, policy makers, and scholars, this article contends that they actually share many common features.Drawing on a vast and rapidly growing literature, this article seeks to frame the key debates on development and war-induced internal displacement and resettlement. It begins with an overview of definitional issues -including "internal displacement" and "resettlement" -two concepts that are regularly contested and misunderstood. The article observes that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have, to some extent, clarified the rights of development and 6 Muggah conflict-induced internally displaced people, as well as the responsibilities of states. It notes that in practice, however, resettlement of both types of populations is treated separately. The article then turns to a number of seminal theoretical contributions to the study of development and conflict-induced internal displacement and involuntary resettlement (DIDR and CIDR, respectively). The article highlights their separate evolution in theory and practice over time. It closes with a brief treatment of some of the common features of DIDR and CIDR, including their political economy, their institutional and bureaucratic logic, and similar patterns of impoverishment risks.

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“…26. See, for example, Betts, 1984;Rogge, 1980;Gorman, 1993;and Kibreab, 1996and Kibreab, , 1989and Kibreab, , 1983Demusz, 1998;Waters, 1999;and Crisp, 2001). 27.…”

Section: Discussionunclassified

A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development‐induced Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement

Muggah

2003

International Migration

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“…The most basic way for refugees to ensure their food supply is often farming, which in many cases is virtually impossible as host governments tend to use some of the country’s least fertile land as refugee camps. One reason for this is allegedly to avoid stirring resentment toward refugees among country citizens who may perceive refugees as infringing on the country’s precious arable farmland (Rogge, 1981, p. 203; Werker, 2007, p. 472).…”

Section: Refugees’ Access To Economies Of Scalementioning

confidence: 99%

“…135, 138). Another argument against integrating refugees is that they “steal” jobs from low-skilled people and lower their wages (Rogge, 1981, p. 200; Bookman, 2002, pp. 126, 135).…”

Section: How R-sezs Lead To Refugee Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2. For instance, while the UNHCR may provide basic accommodations and daily rations, the government may want to raise living standards above that to prevent a human disaster on their soil and the threat to safety that may imply. Desperately poor refugees are also more likely to flee the camp and settle in the country illegally (Rogge, 1981, p. 202; Bookman, 2002, p. 98). Refugee welfare is also a matter of image toward the rest of the world.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Refugee special economic zones

Moberg¹,

Reil

2018

JEPP

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show how special economic zones (SEZs) can be applied to refugee camps. Zones are powerful tools for investors to act like institutional entrepreneurs, who promote institutional reform by pursuing exemptions from government constraints and taxes or by advocating for reform. Refugee SEZs (R-SEZs) would similarly allow for institutional entrepreneurs to promote broader immigration reform. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply a political economy framework to R-SEZs that explores the factors that make them feasible. A mathematical model is applied to explicitly define the conditions under which the zones could succeed in benefiting refugees, investors and the host economy alike. Findings Under certain conditions, appropriate tax rates can be applied to R-SEZs that make them feasible. Feasibility is determined by being beneficial for the host country while also attracting investors. The zones are feasible if they attract enough foreign investors as opposed to domestic investors. Other factors contributing to zone success are higher wages outside the zone, lower wages inside it, higher cost to the government of non-employed refugees, lower relocation cost for businesses and a higher tax rate outside the zone. Practical implications This policy would aim to provide job opportunities to refugees, profit opportunities to investors and lower net costs for the host government. R-SEZs should be considered by policy makers in countries hosting refugee camps. Just like the old model of SEZs, they can benefit workers while also enhancing the government’s budget. Social implications R-SEZs have the potential to alleviate the refugee crisis the world is facing, which is arguably one of the largest social challenges of our time. Originality/value This paper is the first to outline the political economy conditions for SEZs applied to refugee camps.

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“…Voluntary repatriation is the ideal solution for refugees and host states, while refugee resettlement in third countries or integration into host communities can reduce the financial cost for host states and provide greater stability for the refugees than camps. However, resettlement and integration have become less popular over time, as states began to view refugees as economic and environmental burdens, as well as potential security threats (Rogge 1981;Stein 1986;Mandel 1997;Barnett 2002;Adamson 2006). In addition, during the post-Cold War era, major powers no longer view refugees as pawns to be used strategically and they are less welcome in rich and powerful states.…”

Section: Refugee Camp Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Refugee Camp Security: Decreasing Vulnerability Through Demographic Controls

Johnson

2011

Journal of Refugee Studies

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In the past, refugee camp security has been examined in many lights; however, the demographic make-up of camps has not been focused on. In this article, I present a quantitative model that examines attacks on refugee camps. I argue that the likelihood of an attack on a camp is affected by the demographic make-up of the camp. The primary demographic causes that affect vulnerability are the level of male population of the camp, age of camp residents, and the size of the camp. With the available data, I find that these demographic indicators are significant in determining the likelihood of an attack. Assessing what characteristics of camps and their populations increase the likelihood of an attack should serve as a guide to the implementation and organization of new refugee camps to ensure peace and stability for an already fragile community.

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Africa's Resettlement Strategies

Abstract: This paper examines the options for African asylum states in their attempts to support large refugee communities, given the limited resources that most have at their disposal.

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development‐induced Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement

A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development‐induced Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement

Refugee special economic zones

Refugee Camp Security: Decreasing Vulnerability Through Demographic Controls

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