Africa and the Imperative of Philosophy: A Skeptical Consideration

Abstract

The African Studies Association in 1984 gave Paulin Hountondji a share in the Melville Herskovits award for the most significant Africanist publication for the previous year. The selection of Hountondji's book, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983), suggests, logically, that the Association believes the book to be a significant contribution to African Studies. One might go even a step further and conclude that it indicates the Association's concurrence with the main premises and the general philosophical orientation of the author's arguments. This paper outlines some serious questions Hountondji and his fellow philosophers raise about what one's attitude to the African past should be and what criteria should dictate the course of development on the African continent. Hountondji is perhaps the best known of the “professional philosophers.” As one would expect, each of the philosophers perceives the issues that will be raised in this discussion from a different perspective, even when they agree broadly on the critique of ethnophilosophy; Hountondji has nevertheless emerged as the most articulate and representative in this regard, to the extent that his book has earned the title, “the ‘bible’ of anti—ethnophilosophers” (Mudimbe, 1985: 199). The focus of this essay will accordingly be on this important work, with occasional references, of course, to those of others, in particular the Ghanaian Kwasi Wiredu. This strategy has the attraction of straddling the divide between Anglophone and Francophone manifestations of the new philosophical attitudes. To best understand what grounds there might be for objections to certain of the philosophers' positions, it is expedient that one isolate the several targets of their disparagement. Chief of these is ethnophilosophy, which Hountondji (1983: 34) defines as “an ethnological work with philosophical pretensions.” This includes the works of all those who like Placide Tempels, Alexis Kagame, John Mbiti, and other ethnologists have attempted to articulate African philosophies or systems of thought. Another target is African cultures or traditions themselves, as distinct from whatever the ethnophilosophers or ethnologists might correctly or mistakenly have made of them.

Integrating African heritage studies as a new terrain of African philosophy

“…It is this position which shows how mistaken it is to interpret Hountondji's view as a summary dismissal of the philosophical study of African heritage as alleged by Owomoyela (1987). This is because rather than arguing for outright dismissal of the study of African heritage in African philosophy, what Hountondji contends is that the dominant version of African heritage from which the ethnophilosophers claim to deduce African philosophy is inadequate because it neglects and silences the internal contradictions and contestations intrinsic to African heritage.…”

“…Specifically, he responds to criticism from Owomoyela (1987), who alleges, like Owolabi, that by insisting on writing as a prerequisite for philosophy, he deprecated African oral knowledge systems and rejected the philosophical value of the study of African heritage. Hountondji argues that interrogating ethnophilosophy is not tantamount to rejecting the value of the study of African heritage in African philosophy, 'nor does it deny the urgent need for self-discovery and self-rehabilitation' that its study promises (Hountondji 1996: p. xvii).…”

“…However, despite the philosophical foundation required for orientating a new field of study, especially given its focus on 'heritage', a concept of deep philosophical considerations (Tunbridge et al 1996(Tunbridge et al , 2000, AHS has neglected AP in its theoretical orientation; moreover, despite AP's preoccupation with the relationship to and epistemological status of African heritage, it has largely ignored direct engagement with AHS in its corpus of concerns. In this article, I argue for the integration of AHS and AP by highlighting their inherent symbiosis and correcting the mistaken assumption in contemporary African philosophy that the criticisms of ethnophilosophy by Paulin Hountondji (1996) and Kwasi Wiredu (1980, 1984a imply the rejection of the study of African heritage in and as part of African philosophy (Owomoyela 1987). I show that more than any orientation in AP, criticisms of ethnophilosophy, in fact, provide not only the rationale for AHS, but also the most promising theoretical directions for integrating AP and AHS.…”

The Last Decade: A Content Analysis of the African Studies Review, 1982-91

“…were very important. In several emotionally charged essays, contributors detailed the "mesmerization of African artists with Europe and their slavish imitations of 20th century European modernism" (Owomoyela 1987;Udoiem 1987). Out of this, a consensus emerged that popular art was more meaningful in the African context.…”